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I. INTRODUCTION
"In the future everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes."'
For more than thirty years, dispute and confusion have
marked the emergence and development of the so-called "right of
publicity,"' a right that is concerned with the use of attributes of a
generally identifiable person to enhance the commercial value of
an enterprise.3 A dense, complex array of cases, accompanied by
1. Andy Warhol, quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 908 (15th ed. 1980).
2. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently invented the phrase in
1953 in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), in an effort to distinguish the right of exclusive control over the
commercial exploitation of personality from the "right of privacy." The "right of publicity"
is not the most felicitous of phrases and, in the light of history, appears to miss the nature
of the protected interest. Because it has come to be a readily accepted shorthand for the
complex personality interest in economic exploitation, however, this Article will continue
the conventional usage.
3. The right of publicity has been defined as "the right of a celebrity to control and
profit from the use of his name and likeness." Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Recon-
sidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981). Sims' is but one of many definitions and, with its
limitation to the specific attributes of "name and likeness," appears unnecessarily restric-
tive. See infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text. "There is obvious difficulty in defining
a 'right of publicity' for public personages." Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Pub-
licity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 675 (1981) ("[T]he definition of the
right of publicity remains unclear; its theory is still evolving and its limits are uncertain.").
The right of publicity has been defined with surprising consistency by courts and com-
mentators; it is generally conceived as comprising a person's right in the use of his
name, likeness, activities, or personal characteristics. This amicable unanimity in defin-
ing the right is somewhat illusory, however, for there is considerable disagreement
about what the definition means. To begin with, there is no consistent test for deter-
mining how far the right of publicity extends. The language of some courts would
suggest that virtually any recognizable attribute would be protected. But a number of
other decisions have refused to extend the right of publicity nearly as far. As a result,
the extent to which a person's attributes are protected by the right of publicity remains
unclear.
Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577, 1589-90 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
In this article, the right of publicity is considered peculiarly celebrity based, arising
only in the case of an individual who has attained some degree of notoriety or fame. See,
e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc., v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 141, 296 S.E. 2d 697, 702 (1982). Although commentators disagree over
whether "celebrity" is a necessary element of the cause of action or relates only to the
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and analyzed in an even denser array of commentary, has been the
vehicle for adumbrating the emergent right.
Battle lines are drawn over whether the creature emerging
from the fermenting ooze of modern mass communications is a
species of "property" 4 or a purely personal "privacy" interest."
Everywhere one finds the bodies of tortured analogies:' Is the chi-
mera more like copyright?7 Should it be in the "trademark" or
"service mark" bestiary?8 Do we perhaps have simply another ver-
sion of the old torts of misappropriation and unfair competition? 9
There is general agreement only about the genesis of this "hay-
stack in a hurricane."10 The right of publicity as currently under-
stood was born out of the determination of the Second Circuit in
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.11 that a
celebrity has a right to damages and other relief for the unautho-
rized commercial appropriation of the celebrity's persona and that
such a right is independent of a common-law or statutory right of
extent of damages sustained, in practice the debate is academic. See Frazer, Appropriation
of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 LAW Q. REV. 281, 308 (1983); Hoffman, The Right of Pub-
licity-Heir's Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 1, 5
(1981); Sims, supra, at 473. But cf., Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Person-
ality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1960); Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawn-
ing for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 191, 202-03 (1983) (advocating recognition
of a "universal" right of publicity); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 203, 204 (1954); Pipel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 249, 255-56
(1980); Shipley, supra, at 723-24 n.325.
4. See, e.g., Rader, "The Right of Publicity"-A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y. 228, 233 (1979); see infra notes 46-48, 232 and accompanying text.
5. See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983), af'd., 765 F.2d
79 (6th Cir. 1985); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979); see infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
6. For a thorough discussion of the analogic inflation, see Ausness, The Right of Pub-
licity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Note,
The Right of Publicity, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and Copyright Preemption:
Preventing the Unauthorized Commercial Exploitation of Uncopyrighted Works of Art,
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 265 (1983); Comment, An Assessment of the Copyright Model in
Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 786 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Cifelli & McMurray, The Right of Publicity-A Trademark Model for its
Temporal Scope, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 455 (1984); Heneghan & Wamsley, The Service
Mark Alternative to the Right of Publicity: Estate of Presley v. Russen, 14 PAc. L.J. 181
(1983); Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protection for a Trademark's
"Persona", 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981); Note, Copyright and the Right of Publicity: One
Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1983).
9. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 983-87; see also infra notes 243-53 and accompanying
text.
10. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 418, 485 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
11. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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privacy.
Haelan and its progeny in the federal courts in New York
12
have been the principal support for the doctrine that the right of
publicity protects a distinct economic interest in personality and
that while it may have cognates, it is an unique common-law right
different from those to which it might be analogized. The doctrine,
predicated on a federal court's interpretation of New York law, has
not been confined to New York; the Haelan formulation of the
right of publicity generally has been accepted,13 and, in the course
of the period of more than thirty years since Haelan was decided,
the doctrine has become more sophisticated. In December 1984,
however, the New York Court of Appeals announced in Stephano
v. News Group Publication, Inc.14 that the federal courts have not
accurately interpreted New York law and that in New York, where
the right presumably was born, there is no common-law "right of
publicity."
The development of the right of publicity since Haelan cer-
tainly has been chaotic. Nevertheless, until Stephano an underly-
ing consistency had moved the law toward greater consonance with
the commercial and social reality of the interests involved in the
commercialization of the intangible, evanescent persona. The effect
of the New York "reversal" of Haelan on the movement cannot be
determined yet. The doctrine on which the movement of the law
had been based is sound; the interest that the right of publicity
embraces is unique and deserves common-law recognition predi-
cated upon the interest's unique nature.
The interest, a function of the societal recognition that com-
mercial value may be associated with the persona of celebrity,
should serve as the primary tool for shaping the form and content
of the right. Policy determinations, balancing that individual inter-
est against other, more general, public interests, may then serve to
set the boundaries of protectability.
12. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2114 (1985); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc., v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. See infra notes 36-44, 54-61 and accompanying text.
14. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984). See infra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
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II. KNOTS: THE PRIVACY LINKAGE
The Haelan decision in 1953 recognized the independent right
of publicity by differentiating that right from the already existing
right of privacy. 15 The association of the distinctly economic inter-
est in personality with the privacy interest in solitude, the right to
be free from public exposure, has been the source of much confu-
sion.16 The process by which the right of publicity came to be
linked to the right of privacy is more fortuitous than inevitable,
more paradoxical than logical. If we are to understand this strange
creature, a brief look at its putative forebear is in order. Considera-
tion of the right of privacy must begin with the Pavesich" and
Roberson'8 cases, in each of which a vendor used a photograph of a
theretofore private person to advertise its product.
In Pavesich an insurance company used a photograph of the
plaintiff in an advertisement for its life insurance. Building on
what has become one of the most influential law review articles
ever published, Warren's and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," 9
the Georgia Supreme Court found a common-law right of redress
for nondefamatory, but unconsented to, exposure of the plaintiff's
likeness. The court sought to redress an injury to the plaintiff's
feelings attendant to the breach of his solitude.2"
15. Kwall, supra note 3, at 196-97; see infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
16. Ausness, supra note 6, at 981-83; Frazer, supra note 3, at 295-99; Huff, Thinking
Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REv. 777, 784 (1980); Sims, supra note 3, at 464-65;
Shipley, supra note 3, at 681-82.
17. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
18. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
19. 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). "It has come to be regarded as the outstanding exam-
ple of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 383, 384 (1960). It has been suggested that Warren and Brandeis, "in the process of
searching for [a common law right of privacy] succeeded in inventing it." Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 3, at 1581. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 81-82 (W. Va.
1984).
20.
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used for such a purpose and
displayed in such places as such advertisements are often liable to be found brings not
only the person of an extremely sensitive nature, but even the individual of ordinary
sensibility, to a realization that his liberty has been taken away from him, and, as long
as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he can not be otherwise than conscious of
the fact that he is, for the time being, under the control of another, that he is no longer
free, and that he is in reality a slave without hope of freedom, held to service by a
merciless master; and if a man of true instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one
can be more conscious of his complete enthrallment than he is.
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes. . . the right of privacy, and
that the publication of one's picture without his consent by another as an advertise-
ment . .. is an invasion of this right, that we venture to predict that the day will come
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Earlier, the New York Court of Appeals had not been per-
suaded by Warren and Brandeis. That court rejected the idea that
there existed a common-law right independent of defamation that
would give Ms. Roberson a claim based upon the injury to her feel-
ings that resulted from her face appearing on posters advertising
flour.21 The New York legislature responded immediately and cre-
ated a statutory right - entitled "the right of privacy" - to in-
junctive relief and damages for the unauthorized use of a living
person's name or likeness "for advertising purposes or for the pur-
poses of trade. 2
2
Both the common-law and the statutory recognition of the
right of privacy were predicated upon the interest of an individual
in the exclusive nature of his personality. Whether phrased in
terms of the right "to be let alone"2 s or freedom from exposure,24
the right of privacy was the vehicle for the protection of an inter-
nal interest, the feelings of one who involuntarily has been publicly
"used. 25 As noted in Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master,6
"Relief is available under the applicable privacy law only for acts
when the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges
of eminence and ability ....
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 220, 50 S.E. 68, 80-81 (1905). See Ep-
stein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. Rav. 455 (1978):
The view in Pavesich is that the plaintiff in fact owns his name and his portrait, and
their use by another constitutes but a refined form of theft. . . . The sentiments in
Pavesich may not have the elegance of economic theory, but they do have a kind of
intuitive solidity which may be worth even more. The opinion has the universal appeal
to which ordinary people, and ordinary judges, can instantly respond.
Id. at 462-63 (footnotes omitted).
21.
An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the so-called "right of
privacy" has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and ... the doc-
trine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have long been guided.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).
22. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1986).
23. Prosser, supra note 19, at 389 (1960) (quoting COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
24. Ausness, supra note 6, at 981.
25. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194,
197 (1955) ("The gist of the cause of actiop in a privacy case is . . . a direct wrong of a
personal character resulting in injury to the feelings .... The injury is mental and subjec-
tive."); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975,
978 (1959) ("The primary purpose of this legislation was to protect the sentiments, thoughts
and feelings of an individual."); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 (W.
Va. 1984) ("The right has primarily served to prevent the emotional harm which results
from the unauthorized use of an individual's name or likeness to promote a particular prod-
uct or service."); see Ausness, supra note 6, at 981; Gordon, supra note 3, at 554-55; Pilpel,
supra note 3, at 256; Sims, supra note 3, at 464-65.
26. 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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that invade plaintiffs' privacy and consequently bruise their feel-
ings. . . . [I]ts primary purpose, like that of common law privacy,
is to protect the feelings and privacy of the 'little man.' ",27 Because
the interest involved is the subjective, emotional harm flowing
from exposure, a plaintiff might maintain an action even when no
one but the plaintiff and plaintiff's closest family could identify
the appropriated "likeness" as that of the plaintiff.28
As an historical phenomenon, the right of privacy was born
and developed at a time when celebrity was not itself a commodity
capable of widespread exploitation.29 Indeed, lending one's name
for commercial purposes could be seen as demeaning. As recently
as 1962, the First Circuit held that imitation of the voice of a well-
known entertainer in a television commercial could itself constitute
defamation because the imitation created the inference that the
entertainer had "stooped to perform below his class."30
In a societal context in which unauthorized commercial appro-
priation of a personality is seen as an invasion, causing shame, dis-
comfort, or irritation, rather than economic loss, it is not unreason-
able for such an appropriation to be considered part of the
"privacy" interest.3 1 That context gave rise to Dean Prosser's much
quoted and discussed quadruped: the model of the "privacy" tort
as encompassing four distinct variants of personality invasion, one
of which is the "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of
27. Id. at 1198; c.f. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1979).
28. Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457
(1984). In Cohen, the defendant had used in an advertisement a photograph, taken without
consent, of the plaintiff and her young daughter wading nude in a stream; the view is from
the rear and side and the faces are not visible. Only the plaintiff and her husband could
identify the forms as those of the plaintiff and her daughter. In the plaintiff's right of pri-
vacy action, the court denied summary judgment for the defendant.
29. Gordon, supra note 3, at 554-55 ("The innovators of the privacy doctrine could not
have foreseen the advent of radio, television and motion pictures, and the concomitant
scope and variety of commercial exploitations of names, likenesses and personalities of indi-
viduals." (footnote omitted)).
30. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962). Cf. Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (another voice imitation case, in which the
passage of ten years caused the court to note that "[A] star performer's endorsement of a
commercial product is a common occurrence and does not indicate either a dimuniton of
professional reputation nor [sic] a loss of professional talent ..
31.
The reason the "appropriation of name or likeness" tort came to be associated with
privacy, and not considered a kind of theft of property. . . is that at the end of the
last century the use of someone's name or likeness in commercial enterprises might
have subjected that person to strong social censure.
Huff, supra note 16, at 785.
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the plantiff's name or likeness. '32 Although Prosser denominates
the operative act "appropriation," in the context of "privacy" the
wrong is more in the nature of an assault on the person rather than
a theft.3 3
Consequently, several decisions concluded that a celebrity,
particularly one who has sought to capitalize on his notoriety, can-
not claim that an unauthorized commercialization of his identity
has injured his feelings. The celebrity effectively has waived his
right of privacy and can have no relief under a "privacy" um-
brella.3 4 If one considers the right of publicity simply as the "ap-
32. See Prosser, supra note 19, at 389, in which he categorizes the aspects of invasion
of the right of privacy: "(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude. . .(2) Pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing private facts. . . .(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light. . . .(4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness." Id.
Although the Prosser model has been embodied in the Second Restatement of Torts, of
which Dean Prosser was the Reporter, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977),
there has been considerable debate over both his approach and the underlying Warren -
Brandeis exposition. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at Any Price: A Response to
Professor Posner's Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REV. 429 (1978); Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964);
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 326 (1966); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 COR-
NELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
33. See supra note 25.
34. "[The individual] plaintiffs' claims fail under this standard, for as public figures,
with their likenesses, names and images already in the public domain, they have waived
their rights to claim intrusions into their common law privacy rights .... Moreover, they
cannot demonstrate harm to their feelings justifying legal action." Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc.
v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted); see Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); O'Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Ausness supra
note 6, at 981 ("Celebrities and entertainers who have actively sought publicity cannot
honestly claim to be offended by public exposure alone" (citing cases limiting or denying
recovery)); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories,
51 TEx. L. REv. 637 (1973):
The nature of the injury to self-esteem caused by advertising is elusive.... The pecu-
liar nature of advertising, rather than the mere fact of publicity, must cause whatever
injury occurs .... So far no scientist has offered evidence that people generally experi-
ence displeasure, anger, shock, or hatred when their name or picture appears in an
advertisement without their consent. Nor has any court so precisely identified the
nature of their injury. Nonetheless ... some sort of compensable injury to sensibilities
occurs, as a matter of law, if not as a datum of science ....
Whatever the precise nature of the injury, the general theory of invasion of privacy
adequately protects the interests of private individuals and of many celebrities in many
cases. Courts, however, have sometimes had great difficulty referring to a celebrity's
right to privacy to award damages in advertising cases ....
In reality the injury to sensibilities concept does not normally meaningfully apply
when a person routinely permits advertising uses of his name or picture. Any anger or
1206
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propriation" leg of the privacy tort, protecting against an assault
on personality that creates injury to feelings, the logical result
must be the denial of any celebrity's claim that his name or like-
ness has been appropriated commercially. Either the jurisdiction
recognizes the right of privacy with its concomitant celebrity
waiver, or it does not recognize the right of privacy and conse-
quently refuses to recognize what it views as a derivative of that
right.3 5 For the most part, however, courts either have avoided fol-
lowing this logic to its conclusion or have abandoned the privacy
trap altogether, carving out a different interest and a different set
of criteria with respect to the unsanctioned commercial exploita-
tion of a celebrity's personality.
A. The Independent Right: Haelan and its Progeney
In 1953 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc." presented both the necessity and opportunity to recognize a
right distinct from the right of privacy. In Haelan a baseball
player had granted the plaintiff the exclusive right to use the
player's name and likeness on cards distributed with the plaintiff's
bubble gum. The ballplayer then granted similar rights to the de-
outrage that he might feel hardly flows from the shock of confronting his likeness in an
advertisement. Rather, his injury takes the form of diminished income. The harm re-
sides not in the use of his likeness but in the user's failure to pay.
Id. at 640-41 (emphasis added). See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 204-06.
35. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Say., 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir.
1974).
[T]he Court believes that whether the right.., is denominated [the] right to privacy
[or the] "right to publicity". . . it stems from Court recognition that an individual has
the right to control the use of his own name and image and the publication of informa-
tion about himself. If that right is conceded, several distinct causes of action may arise
from it, depending upon the particular conditions [citing Prosser] . . . .All these
actions stem from the initial recognition of a right to control the use of one's own name
and image, which the Nebraska Supreme Court explicitly rejected .... Plaintiff's char-
acterization of his action as one seeking damages for "misappropriation" cannot serve
as a means to escape the rule ....
Id. at 1084-85 (citations omitted). Nebraska has since recognized the right of privacy by
statute, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (1983), and it now appears that every state recog-
nizes some form of privacy action. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70,
82 (W. Va. 1984); Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebri-
ties, 42 BROoKL IN L. REV. 527, 540 (1976) ("Courts persist in confusing the right of publicity
with the right of privacy and deny relief for invasion of the right of publicity in cases in
which relief for invasion of the right of privacy is barred."). But cf., House v. Sports Films &
Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing a right of publicity not-
withstanding nonrecognition of the right of privacy). See infra notes 57-58 and accompany-
ing text.
36. 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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fendant, who argued that whatever rights the plaintiff had were
purely personal privacy rights derived from New York's privacy
statute, so that notwithstanding the terms of the plaintiff's con-
tract with the ballplayer, the ballplayer had conveyed to the plain-
tiff nothing more than a release or nonexclusive license to use the
player's name and likeness.
Judge Frank, writing for the majority, held that the New York
privacy statute did not limit the plaintiff's rights; that New York
law recognized an independent, common-law right protecting eco-
nomic interests rather than the personal, emotional interests con-
templated by the right of privacy; and that such a right, by its
nature, must be exclusively assignable.
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute) [and which is "personal and non-
assignable"], a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that
such a grant may validly be made "in gross"....
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowl-
edge that many prominent persons . . ., far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely de-
prived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses
[sic], trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred
any other advertiser from using their pictures.
We think the New York decisions recognize such a right.
3 7
With this succinct analysis, unencumbered by glosses on the right
of privacy, Judge Frank enunciated a right flowing from the eco-
nomic value of celebrity. He recognized an interest, distinct from
privacy, that deserved distinct protection, even though the opera-
tive act invading that interest - publication for commercial pur-
poses - is the same act that might invade the interest protected
by the right of privacy.
Shortly after the Haelan decision, Professor Nimmer sought
to define the "new" right.38 Seeing Haelan as predicated upon the
separation of the celebrity's economic right from "privacy" consid-
erations,3 9 he detailed the inadequacy of the right of privacy" and
other existing models.4' The privacy concept, he noted,
37. 202 F.2d at 868.
38. Nimmer, supra note 3.
39. Nimmer, however, noted the caveat-a prophecy realized some thirty years
later-that Haelan might not be an accurate statement of New York law. Id. at 222.
40. Id. at 204-07.
41. Id. at 210-15.
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is not adequate to meet the demands of the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. . . .With the tremendous strides in communications, advertising, and
entertainment techniques, the public personality has found that the use of
his name, photograph, and likeness has taken on a pecuniary value un-
dreamed of at the turn of the century.42
Nimmer's concern, like Judge Frank's, was not with the new right's
label, but with the conceptual foundation of the legal rights at-
tendant to the emerging interest. Later cases and commentators
were left to embellish and complicate a rather simple proposition.
The courts generally have been willing to recognize a distinct
commercial exploitation interest, but only after ritually loosening
it from its privacy mooring or other, more traditional berths. Thus,
shortly after Haelan, the Third Circuit, after noting the various
legal characterizations of the exploitation interest, concluded that
an average person's privacy interest and a professional performer's
"property right . . . to the product of his services" were polar ex-
tremes on the same spectrum. Nonetheless, the court found that
the extremes should be distinguished and treated differently. 3
Uhlaender v. Henricksen44 is exemplary of judicial treatment
of the right. In Uhlaender the federal district court in Minnesota
could not treat the commercial exploitation of baseball players
with Judge Frank's simple clarity, but first had to comb through
the underbrush of privacy and "misappropriation." The court
noted the importance of distinguishing the two concepts and even-
tually concluded that a "celebrity has a legitimate proprietary in-
terest in his public personality.' 45 To a great extent, the lever of
"property right," abjured by the Haelan court,4" became the tool
for prying the new right away from privacy and the source for what
may well have been pointless dispute. Court after court, faced
with a "right of publicity" claim, has compulsively recited the lit-
any of the four-pronged privacy right before separating the fourth
prong, a celebrity's proprietary, nonprivacy interest.48
42. Id. at 203-04.
43. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485-87 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
44. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
45. Id. at 1282 (emphasis added).
46. "Whether it be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often else-
where, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth." Haelan Laboratories, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
47. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983):
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With respect to "appropriation" of a celebrity's persona, Dean
Prosser's extraordinary effort to articulate and codify the right of
privacy has become a straw man, to be raised, analyzed, distin-
guished, and dismissed. That confusion has been rampant in this
area is apparent from the cases themselves;49 to attribute the con-
fusion to the Prosser analysis5" is an oversimplification, if not
churlish.5 Commercialization of personality only recently has in-
vaded our daily lives. Courts, not surprisingly, examined early
claims for economic injury from unwanted publicity in the light of
societal attitudes associating that publicity with the emotional dis-
tress flowing from violation of the right of privacy.52 Unfortu-
nately, in the current societal context in which commercialization
of celebrity is commonplace, the Prosser analysis "does not explain
why appropriation of personality may be described as an aspect of
the invasion of privacy.
5 3
Some courts have sought expressly to divorce publicity from
privacy. In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.5 4 the
court eschewed the customary merger and separation of the two
interests and recognized the right of a celebrity or public person to
recover for the unauthorized commercial use of his persona irre-
The confusion in this area of the law requires a brief analysis of the relationship be-
tween these two rights.
In an influential article, Dean Prosser delineated four distinct types of the right of
privacy .... [The] fourth type has become known as the "right of publicity .... .
His first three types of the right of privacy generally protect the right "to be let
alone," while the right of publicity protects the celebrity's pecuniary interest in the
commercial exploitation of his identity .... Thus, the right of privacy and the right
of publicity protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed separately.
Id. at 834 (citations omitted). But cf., Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Say.,
501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 436-37, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004,
1010 (App. Div. 1981).
49. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 n.2 (D. Minn. 1970)
(repeating and noting the persistence of the "haystack in a hurricane" image of Ettore v.
Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956)).
50. "Dean Prosser's analysis has been a source of some confusion in the law." Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); see Sims, supra
note 3 at 464-65; Note, supra note 35 at 531.
51. Kwall, supra note 3, observed that "a careful reading of Prosser's article suggests
that had the right of publicity been an established legal doctrine at the time of his writing,
he might have been inclined to separate the appropriation tort from the other privacy
torts." Id. at 193 (footnote omitted).
52. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
53. Frazer, supra note 3, at 296.
54. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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spective of the label attached to that right.55 In 1983 the Sixth Cir-
cuit reviewed the privacy model, but upheld the celebrity's right of
publicity claim notwithstanding the court's finding that neither the
celebrity's name nor his likeness had been appropriated.
The district court dismissed appellants' claim based on the right of publicity
because appellee does not use Carson's name or likeness . . . We believe
that. . . the district court's conception of the right of publicity is too narrow
... [A] celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial ex-
ploitation of his identity. If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited,
there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his "name or likeness"
is used."6
A recent Minnesota decision,57 noting that the state did not recog-
nize a right of privacy, nevertheless held that a celebrity is entitled
to bring an- action for unauthorized appropriation of his persona
because a "celebrity's property interest in his name and likeness is
unique. '15
B. Retying the Knot: Stephano v. News Group Publications,
Inc.
In general, the post-Haelan cases and commentary consist-
ently evidenced a movement toward recognition of the indepen-
dent right. In New York, despite some intimation that Haelan and
subsequent federal cases did not definitively state New York law,59
55.
[W]e conclude that the California appellate courts would ... afford legal protection to
an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity. We need not decide whether
they would do so under the rubric of "privacy," "property," or "publicity"; we only
determine that they would recognize such an interest and protect it.
Id. at 825-26.
56. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)
(citations and emphasis omitted); see Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70
(W. Va. 1984):
[The] "right of privacy" is not to be confused with the "right of publicity" first
recognized in Haelan .... which remedies the unjust enrichment caused by an unau-
thorized exploitation of the good will and reputation that a public figure develops in
his name or likeness through the investment of time, money and effort .... The right
of privacy protects individual personality and feelings, the right of publicity protects
the commercial value of a name or likeness.
Id. at 85 n.6 (citations omitted).
57. House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. App. 1984).
58. Id. at 685 (quoting Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn.
1970)).
59. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1981):
New York courts have never explicitly recognized a non-statutory right of publicity
Irrespective of whether a separate and distinct common law right of publicity
exists in this State, we believe that the so-called right of publicity is subsumed in
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the Haelan doctrine appeared firmly established,60 and it was "as-
sumed that the New York courts would recognize such a common
law right independent of that protected by [statute]."'" Neverthe-
less, in December 1984 the New York Court of Appeals held in
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.12 that no common-law
right of publicity exists in New York:
[T]he statute [Civil Rights Law, Sections 50 and 51] applies to any use of a
person's picture or portrait for advertising or trade purposes . . .. [T]he
statue parallels the common law right of privacy which generally provides
remedies for any commercialization of the individual's personality without his
consent . . . .Since the "right of publicity" is encompassed under the Civil
Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy, which. . . is exclusively stat-
utory. . , the plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-law right of
publicity."'
Stephano, of course, is too recent to allow confident prediction
of its impact, but some of the construction problems flowing from
its rejection of Haelan are evident. The Court of Appeals itself rec-
ognized that it transformed certainty into confusion with respect
to descendibility and assignability of the no longer independent
right of publicity. 4 Of more immediate concern is Stephano's ef-
fect on cases involving appropriation of identity, even for commer-
cial purposes, when the "identity" involved is other than the statu-
tory requirements of "name," "portrait," and "picture."
For example, a New York court probably would agree with the
Sixth Circuit's" determination that the phrase "Here's Johnny"
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law .... [T]he statute does not distinguish
between the private person for whom injured feelings may be the paramount concern
and the public figure whose right of privacy is limited in any event by public interest
considerations, but whose economic interests are affected by the wrongful exploitation
of his or her name or likeness .... Both injuries are caused by the same wrong and
should be redressed by the same cause of action.
Id. at 435, 439-40, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1009, 1012 (citations omitted); see Frosch v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (App. Div. 1980) ("No such nonstatutory
right has yet been recognized by the New York State courts .... "); see Nimmer, supra
note 3, at 222.
60. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2114 (1985); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220-21 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555
F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,
400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
62. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
63. Id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (footnote and citations omitted).
64. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
65. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
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used to advertise a portable toilet did not involve an appropriation
of Johnny Carson's "name," but Stephano appears to preclude a
further finding that the undisputed appropriation of Carson's
"identity" was independently actionable absent a determination of
unfair competition or public confusion." Stephano also appears to
overrule New York decisions such as Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc.,'7 in which the court sustained a right of publicity
claim despite a finding that the defendant appropriated neither a
"name" nor any other statutorily specified attribute; the plaintiff's
"identity" was embedded in a distinctive musical style. Although
the New York interpretation of "portrait or picture" has been
somewhat flexible, 8 the interpretation probably cannot be
stretched to accommodate the variety of ways in which one might
attempt to commercialize a celebrity's persona.
Stephano seems to have retied the conceptual knot between
privacy and publicity, merging the quite different interests each
recognizes and in the process attenuating the right of publicity.
The statutory protection that New York and other "statutory" ju-
risdictions afford the right of privacy is quite specific. Moreover,
the statutory limitations to "name, portrait, or picture" do not dif-
fer significantly from the common-law focus upon "name or like-
ness." In both, the more elusive concept of "identity" - the celeb-
rity's persona - is largely ignored. In view of Haelan's prominence
in the development of the right of publicity throughout the United
States, the New York Court of Appeals' apparent rejection of the
case may have ramifications far beyond New York, 9 which, as an
entertainment center, has been the principal jurisdiction dealing
with the right of publicity.
The consequences of recombining publicity and privacy al-
ready have been felt. In Allen v. National Video, Inc.,70 decided in
May 1985, a federal district court in New York was required to
assess Stephano's effect on claims arising out of advertising tech-
66. Id. at 835-36; see also infra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
67. 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977).
68. See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d
457 (1984); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254
(Sup. Ct. 1984).
69. It is interesting to note, and perhaps indicative of the current judicial mood, that
in a recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Posner makes reference to "the commercial-ap-
propriation branch of the right of privacy - what is sometimes called the 'right of public-
ity.' . . . " Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986).
70. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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niques most peculiar to the intangible value of celebrity. In Allen a
franchisor of video cassette rental outlets pictured a Woody Allen
"look-alike" in its advertisements. The defendants included the
franchisor, the "look-alike," and his employer, "Ron Smith's Ce-
lebrity Look-Alikes," an agency formed specifically to capitalize on
the public infatuation with celebrity. Allen sued for damages and
for an injunction to end the continued impersonation by the indi-
vidual "look-alike" and the employing agency. He alleged a viola-
tion of his New York statutory right to privacy, his common-law
right of publicity, and his rights under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.71
With respect to the right of publicity claim, the court held
that Stephano means that "no separate common law cause of ac-
tion to vindicate the right of publicity exists in New York ...
[and that the court must] treat plaintiff's causes of action for pri-
vacy and publicity together under the general rubric of privacy.
'7 2
Consequently, the defendants' patent attempts to evoke the plain-
tiff's identity for their commercial purposes was largely irrelevant
for the merged "privacy" claim. Rather, the sole issue was whether
the use of a "look-alike" in the context of the advertisement
amounted to the use of Allen's "picture" under the privacy stat-
ute.7 3 While Judge Motley chose not to resolve this question, find-
ing that the Lanham Act claim afforded the plaintiff the injunctive
relief he sought,7 4 she expressed serious concern over Stephano's
impact:
Since the New York Court of Appeals has subsumed the common law right of
publicity within the relatively narrow statutory requirements of Section 51
[of the Civil Rights Law], it may fall to the state legislature to fashion a
workable remedy to protect the pecuniary interests of celebrities in the mar-
ket value of their identities . . . .Controlling the use of a person's "portrait
or picture" may be sufficient to protect the feelings of private citizens, but a
broader statute . . . might provide fuller protection for the interests
threatened when a celebrity's endorsement is implied without the use of an
actual "portrait or picture.'
7
As Judge Motley recognized, to the extent that Stephano has
retied the knot joining the right of publicity to the right of privacy,
the law has been deprived of the benefits of a flexible common-law
approach to the commercialization of identity and the "associative
71. Id. at 617.
72. Id. at 621.
73. Id. at 622.
74. Id. at 624-25; see infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 624 n.5.
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value" inherent in celebrity. The complex interests peculiar to the
formerly independent right of publicity are thereby left
unprotected.
III. DESCENDIBILITY: "WHO IS THE HEIR OF FAME? '
The chaotic consequences of the linkage of privacy and public-
ity are demonstrated most vividly in the post mortem "star" wars,
the ghoulish pursuit of profit from the persona of a deceased celeb-
rity. Judicial opinion and commentary alike divide over the issue
of descendibility: whether a celebrity's assignees or heirs may as-
sert the celebrity's exclusive commercial exploitation right and, if
so, whether any such post mortem right is conditioned upon the
existence and extent of the celebrity's lifetime commercial ex-
ploitation of his persona.70 The recent focus upon the issue of
descendibility has diverted attention from the issues central to the
development of the right of publicity itself. There seems to have
evolved an ad hoc jurisprudence of death in which the celebrity
interest and the public interest become muddled rather than clari-
fied. It is fitting that the polarity of views as to descendibility is
mirrored in a polarity of central figures - Martin Luther King,
Jr.," and Count Dracula. 8 While Elvis Presley, 9 Laurel and
76. For representative commentary in this area, see Ausness, supra note 6, at 1003-10
(suggesting limiting post mortem actions to assigness who purchased their publicity rights
during the celebrity's lifetime, thereby dealing with both the exploitation and survivability
problems); Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights in the Names, Likenesses or Personalities
of Deceased Persons, 16 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 17 (1968); Felcher & Rubin, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YAL.E
L.J. 1125 (1980); Gordon, supra note 3; Hoffman, supra note 3, at 44 (advocating "the fully
uninhibited and unlimited descent of publicity rights"); Kwall, supra note 3, at 207-29 ("[A]
freely descendible righty of publicity for all individuals is the only approach which truly
vindicates the primary interests protected by the right of publicity.") Id. at 228; Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981); McLane,
The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths
Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 415 (1984); Sims,
supra note 3, at 480-81 ("The relationship among survivability of publicity rights, lifetime
exercise, and incremental career achievement is quite speculative .... The logic of the
lifetime exercise requirement is sufficiently tenuous that fairness requires that any doubts
be resolved in favor of the survivability of the celebrity's publicity rights for the benefit of
his heirs.").
77. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
78. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
79. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981),
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Hardy,80 and the Marx Brotherssl have provided something ap-
proaching slapstick comedy and farce, Agatha Christie8 2 has cre-
ated mystery, and Tennessee Williams 8 has provided the dramatic
irony.8 4
A. Polarity and Complexity: Martin Luther King, Jr., and
Dracula
In 1982 in Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change,
Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc.,8 5 the Supreme Court of
Georgia, speaking again with the clarity that marked its recogni-
tion of a common-law right of privacy almost eighty years earlier in
Pavesich,s6 found that a celebrity has the exclusive right to control
the exploitation of his personality, 7 and this "right of publicity" is
assignable 8 and descendible.8 9 At issue was the right of Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s estate and certain assignees to prevent the de-
fendant from selling plastic busts of Dr. King. The litigation began
in a federal court in Georgia,90 but in a refreshing effort to avoid
the problems created by federal court enunciation of forum state
law in the absence of definitive state court holdings, 91 the Eleventh
Circuit certified 92 the following questions to the Supreme Court of
Georgia:
(1) Is the "right to [sic] publicity" recognized in Georgia as a right distinct
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
80. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
81. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
83. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
84. This case provides particular irony because a lower New York court rendered the
decision, which enunciated a descendible common law right of publicity distinct from New
York's statutory right of privacy, one week before the New York Court of Appeals
announced that there is no common law right of publicity in New York, Stephano v. News
Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984); see supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
85. 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
86. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
87. 250 Ga. at 143, 296 S.E.2d at 703.
88. Id. at 143, 296 S.E.2d at 704.
89. Id. at 145, 296 S.E.2d at 705.
90. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), reo'd, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
91. See supra notes 59-64, and infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
92. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3902 (Harrison 1981 & Supp. 1984); see also Miree v.
United States, 242 Ga. 126, 131-33, 249 S.E.2d 573, 577-78 (1978).
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from the right to [sic] privacy?
(2) [D]oes the "right to [sic] publicity" survive the death of its owner? Spe-
cifically, is the right inheritable and devisable?
(3) [M]ust the owner have commercially exploited the right before it can sur-
vive his death?
93
Building on Pavesich, Georgia's highest court answered the
first question affirmatively. The court concluded "that while pri-
vate citizens have the right of privacy, public figures have a similar
right of publicity. . .", Although the court noted the similarity
of the celebrity's right of publicity 5 to the private citizen's right of
privacy, the court did not then mechanically use the privacy simile,
the associated Prosser analysis, and the concomitant assumption of
a purely personal right" to dispose of the descendibility issue.
Rather, the court looked at the nature of the right, the real interest
being protected, in coming to an affirmative answer to the second
question.9 7
The court began by holding, like Haelan,98 that a celebrity
may assign the right of publicity during his lifetime. The court
noted that "without this characteristic, full commercial exploita-
tion of one's name and likeness is practically impossible . . . [and
that] without assignability the right of publicity could hardly be
called a 'right.' ",s The court's laconic treatment of the matter of
assignability should not obscure the fact that this concept is fun-
damental to the development of a common-law right of publicity
and that right's separation from the right of privacy. Indeed, in
Haelan it was the question of assignability that required the Sec-
ond Circuit to find a right of publicity distinct from the New York
statutory right of privacy. 100
From the base of assignability, the Georgia court focused on
93. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); see 250 Ga. at 137, 296 S.E.2d at 699.
94. 250 Ga. at 143, 296 S.E.2d at 703.
95. Once again, as in Pavesich, the Georgia Court moved without elaboration to the
heart of what should be intuitive: the right at issue is peculiar to celebrity. See Epstein,
supra note 20; see also supra note 3.
96. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
97. 250 Ga. at 143-45, 296 S.E.2d at 704-05.
98. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
99. 250 Ga. at 143, 296 S.E.2d at 704 (citation omitted).
100. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. The recent refusal of the New
York Court of Appeals in Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474
N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984), to recognize that distinction at the very least leaves
open the assignability question and the continuing utility of Haelan. See supra notes 62-64
and accompanying text.
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the reality of "celebrity" - the idea that the celebrity creates eco-
nomic value in his persona and that this value can produce profits
for one who exploits that persona - and the correlative policy
question whether the benefits that flow from celebrity should go to
the advertiser, in the form of a windfall profit, or to the celebrity's
heirs.10' Resolving the issue, the court held that "the right of pub-
licity survives the death of its owner and is inheritable and
devisable."'10 2
With respect to the third question, the necessity of lifetime
commercial exploitation (for example, a celebrity's inter vivos
transfer of the right to use his name or likeness'03), the court was
quick to find a negative answer, determining that the celebrity
need not have exploited his persona during his lifetime. 04 The
court treated the matter as a non-issue, finding that the proposi-
tion was fundamentally absurd.
The net result [of requiring lifetime commercial exploitation] would be to say
that celebrities and public figures have the right of publicity during their life-
times (as others have the right of privacy), but only those who contract for
bubble gum cards, posters and tee shirts have a descendible right of publicity
upon their deaths. ... That we should single out for protection after death
those ...who exploit their personae during life, and deny protection after
death to those who enjoy public acclamation but did not exploit themselves
during life, puts a premium on exploitation. Having found that there are
valid reasons for recognizing the right of publicity during life, we find no rea-
son to protect after death only those who took commercial advantage of their
fame.
...In our view, a person who avoids exploitation during life is entitled to
have his image protected against exploitation after death just as much if not
more than a person who exploited his image during life.10 5
101.
Recognition of the right of publicity rewards and thereby encourages effort and creativ-
ity. If the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value of the right of
publicity during life would be diminished because the celebrity's untimely death would
seriously impair, if not destroy, the value of the right of continued commercial use.
Conversely, those who would profit from the fame of a celebrity after his or her death
for their own benefit and without authorization have failed to establish their claim that
they should be the beneficiaries of the celebrity's death. Finally, the trend since the
early common law has been to recognize survivability, notwithstanding the legal
problems which may thereby arise.
250 Ga. at 145-46, 296 S.E.2d at 705.
102. Id. at 145, 296 S.E.2d at 705.
103. Id. at 146, 296 S.E.2d at 705.
104. Id. at 146-47, 296 S.E.2d at 705-06.
105. Id. at 147, 296 S.E.2d at 706 (citation and footnote omitted). The court noted the
exploitation "requirement" arose out of the New York Federal District Court's dicta in
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 250 Ga. at 146, 296
S.E.2d at 705-06.
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The intuitive, down-to-earth approach of the Georgia Supreme
Court is based on the reality of the commercial value of celebrity
in our society, rather than on the morality of commercializing one's
name or the peculiar conceptual label attached to the activity. By
analyzing and focusing on the interests involved, the court avoided
the conceptual pitfalls that have characterized most attempts to
define the right of publicity. 10 8
The Georgia approach may be contrasted with the gyrations of
the California Supreme Court in the Dracula case, Lugosi v. Uni-
versal Pictures,'0 7 in which Bela Lugosi's heirs sought to enjoin
Universal Pictures from commercially exploiting, through the grant
of merchandising licenses, the Count Dracula character bearing
Lugosi's likeness. In denying relief, the court's plurality opinion' 08
relied upon Dean Prosser's four-pronged analysis of privacy with
its attendant emphasis upon the personal nature of the privacy
right.
The right is not assignable and . . . there is no common law right of
action for a publication concerning one who is already dead.
. . .[W]hether or not the right sounds in tort or property, and we think
with Dean Prosser that a debate over this issue is pointless, what is at stake
is the question whether this right is or ought to be personal.
106. Indeed, in his special concurrence Justice Weltner opined that the court went too
far conceptually in even discussing a right of publicity. For Weltner the matter was one of
an obvious unjust enrichment for which there must be redress:
Each lawful restraint finds its legitimacy ... not because it is laid against some immu-
table rule ... but because it is perceived that it would be irresponsible to the interest
of the community-to the extent of being unconsicionable-that such conduct go
unrestrained.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment finds its genesis in such a reckoning. It can be
applied to just such a matter as that before us. Were we to do so, we could avoid
entering the quagmire of combining considerations of "right of privacy," "right of pub-
licity," and considerations of inter vivos exploitation. We would also retain our consti-
tutional right of free speech uncluttered and uncompromised by these new impedi-
ments of indeterminate application.
250 Ga. at 152, 296 S.E.2d 709 (emphasis in original).
107. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
108. The opinion "By The Court," which essentially adopted the intermediate appel-
late court's opinion, see id. at 816, 603 P.2d at 426, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 324, was that of only
three of the justices. Justice Mosk concurred on the ground that a right of publicity should
not attach to an actor merely portraying a character that others created for him, as opposed
to "[aln original creation of a fictional figure played exclusively by its creator, [which] may
well be protectable. .. Groucho Marx just being Groucho Marx, with his moustache, cigar,
slouch and leer, cannot be exploited by others." Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
332 (citation omitted); see infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Bird,
with Justices Manuel and Tobriner, dissented. 25 Cal. 3d at 828, 603 P.2d at 434, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 332.
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*. .We hold that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to
the artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime. 09
With its intermingled discussion of the personal nature of the
right and the need for lifetime exploitation, its passing reference,
without real comment,110 to California's privacy statute,11' and its
academically appealing lack of clarity, the Lugosi opinion has been
the focus of extensive comment." 2 The opinion created confusion
over just what the law in California is, particularly whether
descendibility would be found with respect to commercial uses that
the decedent exercised during his or her lifetime. The confusion
persists notwithstanding the fact that in Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Productions, 3 decided two days after Lugosi, the same
court unequivocally interpreted Lugosi as holding that "the right
of publicity. . . is not descendible and expires upon the death of
the person [protected by the right]."'"
In her dissent in Lugosi" 5 and her concurrence in Gug-
lielmi,1" 6 Chief Justice Bird sought to distinguish the right of pub-
licity from the personal privacy right cognate and urged recogni-
tion of the peculiar economic interest involved, a recognition that
per force would entail descendibility without the need for lifetime
109. 25 Cal. 3d at 820, 823-24, 603 P.2d at 429, 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327, 329
(emphasis in original); see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
110. 25 Cal. 3d at 819 n.6, 603 P.2d at 428 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.6.
111. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1986); cf. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149
Cal. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342-46 (1983) (noting that the statute "comple-
ments" rather than "codifies" the common law right of privacy).
112. See, e.g., Comment, The Right of Publicity: Premature Burial for California
Property Rights in the Wake of Lugosi, 12 PAc. L.J. 987 (1981); Felcher & Rubin, supra
note 76; Sims, supra note 3; see also Kwall, supra note 3, at 218-21.
113. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
114. Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. As the Second Circuit observed:
We conclude that Lugosi is subject to two interpretations. It may mean that California
does not recognize any descendible right of publicity and that the heirs of a celebrity
must rely on trademark law to protect the good will that the celebrity brought to a
product during his lifetime. Alternatively, Lugosi might mean that, wholly apart from
trademark law, California recognizes a descendible right of publicity that enables the
heirs to prevent the use of a celebrity's name and likeness on any product or service the
celebrity promoted by exploiting his right of publicity during his lifetime. . . .Califor-
nia would recognize, at most, a descendible right of publicity only in connection with
particular commercial situations-products and services-that a celebrity promoted
during this lifetime ....
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982). Adopting
the alternative construction, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Lugosi and California law
as recognizing descendibility when there has been lifetime commercial exploitation. Acme
Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1983).
115. 25 Cal. 3d at 828, 603 P.2d at 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
116. 25 Cal. 3d at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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exploitation.'1 7 To deal with the problem of recognizing a theoreti-
cally perpetual post mortem right of publicity, Justice Bird, using
the copyright analogy, proposed to limit the duration of the right
to a period of fifty years after death.""
For California, legislative action has resolved some of the un-
certainty engendered by Lugosi. California Civil Code Section 990,
enacted in 1984, specifically creates "property rights" in certain as-
pects of a deceased personality's persona. 1 9 These property rights
are "freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by
means of trust or testamentary documents.' 20 In the absence of
contract or testamentary disposition, the statute limits the class of
successors'2 ' and, following Justice Bird's suggestion, 22 provides
that no successor may bring an action for a use that occurs more
than fifty years after the death of the deceased celebrity. 123 Al-
117.
The right of publicity protects the intangible proprietary interest in the commercial
value in one's identity. Like other intangible property rights, its value often cannot be
reaped if the individual may not transfer all or part of that interest to another for
development . . . .Since it is clear that the right of publicity is hardly viable unless
assignable, I agree with the numerous authorities that have recognized the right is
capable of assignment.
It is equally clear that the right may be passed to one's heirs or beneficiaries upon
the individual's death. In considering the question of the right's descendibility, it must
be remembered that what is at issue is the proprietary interest in the value of one's
name and likeness in commercial enterprises, not a personal right like the right of
privacy.
...[R]equiring the exercise of the right of publicity during the person's lifetime
as a condition for inheritability is not only inconsistent with the rationale underlying
the right but imposes an ill-defined prerequisite on its preservation.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d at 845-46, 848, 603 P.2d at 445, 447, 160 Cal. Rptr.
at 343, 345 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
119.
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision (c),
shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result
thereof. ...
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights ....
CAL CiV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1986).
120. Id. at § 990(b).
121. Id. at § 990(d).
122. See supra text accompanying note 118.
123. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp. 1986). Moreover, maintenance of an action
by a successor-in-interest is conditioned upon registration with the Secretary of State of a
publicly recorded "claim of the rights." Id.
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though the statute attempts to set standards for determining
whether a given use is for "advertising" purposes, 24 litigation is
the inevitable consequence of making it "a question of fact
whether or not the use . . .was so directly connected with ...
commercial sponsorship or with ... paid advertising as to consti-
tute a use for which consent is required.' 5 The statute exempts
advertising that is merely incidental to an otherwise permitted
use126 and uses that are "in connection with any news, public af-
fairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.' 12 7
The statute also specifically exempts literary, political, artistic, or
"newsworthy" uses.12
The California statutory approach's most interesting aspect is
perhaps its recognition of celebrity value and the concomitant ju-
dicial construction problems that this recognition is likely to pro-
duce. A "deceased personality," the subject for statutory protec-
tion, is defined as "any natural person whose name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the
time of his or her death.' 1 29 Although celebrity value is essential
for protection, the statute makes clear that lifetime commercial ex-
ploitation of that value is not necessary. 30
The California statute undoubtedly will be the source of judi-
124. "The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a commercial
medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is required . . . solely because the
material containing such use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising."
Id. at § 990(k).
125. Id.; cf. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2114 (1985); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1983); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
126. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(n)(4) (West Supp. 1986).
127. Id. at § 990().
128.
This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:
(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or televi-
sion program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt
under paragraph (4).
(2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.
(3) Single and original works of fine art.
(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by para-
graph (1), (2), or (3).
Id. at § 990(n). The statute thus would render academic such issues as were present in
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) and Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
129. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(h) (West Supp. 1986).
130. Id.
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cial emendation and general confusion. 131 Indeed, the provision
that the statute's "remedies ...are cumulative and shall be in
addition to any others provided for by law"' 32 raises the question
whether the courts may yet fashion a "complementary" common-
law remedy.13 3 Of greater significance for the evolution of a celeb-
rity-based right of publicity is the California legislature's choice
neither to codify nor to reject that right; rather, the legislature cre-
ated yet another right, vested solely in the successors of the celeb-
rity, and left unresolved the issues surrounding the conceptual na-
ture of the right of publicity itself.134
California's ad hoc treatment of the right of publicity's
descendibility aspect very well may retard orderly development of
the law and may inflict harm that a comprehensive conceptual ap-
proach based upon the actual interests underlying the right of
publicity could have avoided. California's piecemeal attack on the
problem of descendibility and exploitation will make it both less
necessary and more difficult for the courts and legislatures effec-
tively to articulate the values and interests around which this area
of the law must function and thus will generate the "bad law" that
inevitably flows from "hard cases."
B. Contradictory Policy: The Elvis Presley Litigation
Complexity with respect to the right of publicity has not been
limited to Hollywood. New York, with its theatrical, broadcasting,
and advertising activities, and Tennessee, with its flourishing mu-
sic centers of Nashville and Memphis, have presented the arenas
for further conflict. The primary vehicle for conflict in both juris-
dictions has been the massive effort to capitalize on the public in-
fatuation with the memory of Elvis Presley.
During his lifetime, Presley assigned the exclusive right to ex-
131. For example, because the statute precisely enumerates the uses that are subject
to the rights of successors of a "deceased personality" ("name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness"), one may wonder how a California court might have dealt with
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), which involved
the use of a famous race car driver's distinctive automobile design, had the appropriation
occurred and the action been brought after the personality's death.
132. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(m) (West Supp. 1986).
133. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416-17, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 346 (1983).
134. Thus, it is possible to have the anomalous situation in which, through a literal
reading of Lugosi and Guglielmi-which emphasize the personal, privacy-based nature of
the right-a court might hold that a living celebrity does not have a right of publicity that
he may assign exclusively to others, but that the right of exclusive assignment would vest in
his heirs.
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ploit the commercial value of his personality to Boxcar Enter-
prises, a corporation in which he owned an interest. Shortly after
Presley's death, Boxcar licensed Factors Etc., Inc. to use those
rights.13 5 In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc. 13 6 the Sixth Circuit, propounding Tennessee law, refused to
recognize post mortem exclusivity in Factors. Unlike the California
court, the court did not dwell on the Prosser analysis or on the
question of whether the right of publicity is "property" and there-
fore descendible. Rather, the court dealt with the nature of fame
and how societal values concerning fame may be balanced. The ap-
proach is stated in the opening words of the opinion:
This appeal raises the interesting question: Who is the heir of fame? The
famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the
commercial use of their name and personality. We are called upon . . . to
determine whether . . . the exclusive right to publicity survives a celebrity's
death. We hold that the right is not inheritable. After death the opportunity
for gain shifts to the public domain, where it is equally open to all."'s
In weighing the balance in favor of the public domain, 138 the
court was moved by the ephemeral nature of fame:
Fame often is fortuitous and fleeting. It always depends on the participation
of the public in the creation of an image . . . . The intangible and shifting
nature of fame and celebrity status, the presence of widespread public and
press participation in its creation, the unusual psychic rewards and income
that often flow from it during life and the fact that it may be created by bad
as well as good conduct combine to create serious reservations about making
fame the permanent right of a few individuals to the exclusion of the general
public.1
39
The court examined the policy considerations favoring
descendibility,' 4e but found that these factors were not sufficient.
The court analogized the interest in fame to the interest in reputa-
tion, and concluded that the former should terminate at death just
as the latter does.' 4 1
135. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
136. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
137. 616 F.2d at 957.
138. See Lange, supra note 76.
139. 616 F.2d at 959.
140. Id. at 958.
141.
[T]here are strong reasons for declining to recognize the inheritability of the right. A
whole set of practical problems of judicial line-drawing would raise should the court
recognize such an inheritable right .... Fame falls in the same category as reputation;
it is an attribute from which others may benefit but may not own.
The law of defamation, designed to protect against the destruction of reputation
1224 [Vol. 39:1199
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The court was not particularly concerned with "proprietary"
considerations. Therefore, whether the decedent commercially ex-
ploited his persona during his lifetime is immaterial to the deter-
mination of post mortem rights.142 Rather, the broader societal in-
terest in dominion over a name that the public largely has created
supports what the court deemed to be a "fair" disposition. Re-
jecting the monopolization of post mortem commercial value by a
celebrity's heirs or assigns, the court concluded that "[t]he mem-
ory, name and pictures of famous individuals should be regarded
as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity available
in the free market system.' 43 The Sixth Circuit - much like the
Georgia court in Martin Luther King, Jr.,4 4 although with a con-
trary result - acted intuitively. The court felt simply that some-
thing was not right about institutionalizing "fame":
Heretofore, the law has always thought that leaving a good name to one's
children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual, whether famous or
not. Commercialization of this virtue after death in the hands of heirs is con-
trary to our legal tradition and somehow seems contrary to the moral presup-
positions of our culture.
145
Although the Sixth Circuit purportedly announced Tennessee
law in Memphis Development, the situation subsequently became
cloudy. In 1981 a Tennessee Chancery Court held that, the Sixth
Circuit's contrary determination notwithstanding, Tennessee law
does recognize a descendible right of publicity. 4 In a 1982 deci-
.... provides an analogy. There is no right of action for defamation after death ....
The two interests that support the inheritability of the right of publicity, namely, the
"effort and creativity" and the "hopes and expectations" of the decedent, would also
support an action for libel or slander for destruction of name and reputation after
death. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient to overcome the common law
policy terminating the action for defamation upon death.
Id. at 959 (citation omitted).
142. Id. at 960.
143. Id. at 960.
144. See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
145. 616 F.2d at 959.
146. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2204 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1981). The Chancellor cited with approval Judge Mansfield's dissenting
opinion in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 927 (1982); Mansfield noted Tennessee's prominence in the music industry, and
found that both precedent and policy supported a determination of descendibility:
The right of publicity should survive after death not only because it is supported by
judicial precedent and property interest and fundamental fairness considerations, but
also because of public policy. . . .The ability to leave a valuable property interest to
one's heirs is further incentive for enterprise and creativity and deserves judicial
protection.
Permitting the right of publicity to survive death should have special significance
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sion involving Presley's licensee, however, a different Tennessee
Chancellor followed Memphis Development in holding that Ten-
nessee does not recognize such a descendible right.147 In an effort
to clarify the status of the right of publicity, Tennessee, like Cali-
fornia,' 48 attempted a legislative resolution in 1984.
The Tennessee statute149 is entitled "The Personal Rights
Protection Act of 1984.' '15 ° Unlike the 1984 California statute, with
which Tennessee's statute shares certain provisions,' the Act is
not an ad hoc solution to the conundrum of descendibility, but
purports comprehensively to codify the right of publicity in Ten-
nessee. The Tennessee statute recognizes in "[e]very individual
a property right in the use of his name, photograph or likeness
in any medium in any manner,' 1 2 which right is assignable, licen-
sable, and descendible irrespective of lifetime commercial exploita-
tion. 53 The right endures for the lifetime of the individual, for ten
years after his death, and thereafter unless there shall have been
no commercial exploitation of the decedent's name, photograph, or
likeness for two years following the expiration of the ten year pe-
riod.15 4 Tennessee limits protection to the use of "name, photo-
graph or likeness in any medium . . . as an item of commerce for
purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods or services,
or for purposes of fundraising, solicitation of donations, purchases
of products, merchandise, [and] goods or services . . . . ",n With
some circularity, the statute defines "likeness" as "the use of an
in Tennessee. . . . It would be unreasonable not to protect the efforts and energies of
so many Tennessee artists.
7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2208 (citations omitted). The Tennessee Court of Appeals ap-
pears to have effectively reversed this determination, which was made in connection with a
motion to dismiss the complaint. In 1984, at a later stage in the same proceedings, the court
citod Memphis Development with approval and stated that "a right of publicity does not
survive the death of the holder." Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, No.
83-327-Il slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App., June 20, 1984).
147. Lancaster v. Factors Etc., Inc., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1982).
148. See supra note 119.
149. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1984).
150. Id. at § 47-25-1101.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); see supra notes 119-30 and accompany-
ing text.
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (1984).
153. Id. at § 47-25-1103(b).
154. Id. at § 47-25-1104.
155. Id. at § 47-25-1105(a). The statute is virtually identical to the California statute
in leaving as a "question of fact" whether a given use is "so directly connected with ...
commercial sponsorship or with. . . paid advertising as to constitute a use for purposes of
advertising or solicitation." See § 47-25-1107(b); CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(k) (West Supp. 1986);
see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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image of an individual for commercial purposes. '156
In its purported comprehensiveness, its applicability to "every
individual"15 rather than to celebrities whose personae have "com-
mercial value,"1 58 and its specificity of protected uses, the Tennes-
see statute may in time become a limitation upon, as well as a con-
crete recognition of, the right of publicity.'59 Nevertheless, as in
California, the Tennessee legislature at least has resolved for that
state the issue of the right of publicity's descendibility. With "the
continued growth of Nashville and Memphis as centers for the
lives and activities of music industry personalities,"'160 Tennessee's
position with respect to the right of publicity has an impact paral-
lel to New York's and California's.
While the courts in Tennessee were grappling with claims to
exclusivity asserted by Elvis Presley's post mortem licensee, the
same issue and the same licensee were before the federal courts in
New York. In Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc. ("Factors P,,),61
Factors sought to prevent the distribution and sale of a Presley
"memorial poster," and the Second Circuit was required to deter-
mine New York law with respect to the descendibility of the right
of publicity. The Second Circuit, like the California court in Lu-
gosi,'e6 began by examining the entanglement of the right of pub-
licity with Prosser's analysis of the right of privacy.83 The Prosser
model's linkage and the model's conceptual separation of the pub-
licity right as a "property" right had been the basis for a 1975 dis-
156. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1102(3) (1984).
157. Id. at § 47-25-1103(a).
158. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(h) (West Supp. 1986); see supra notes 129-30 and ac-
companying text.
159. For example, it is doubtful that a television news broadcast's appropriation of an
"entire act" which served to create liability in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977), would be prohibited "advertising" under the Tennessee statute. Cer-
tainly the incorporation of a celebrity's distinct persona in a play, as with the Marx Broth-
ers in Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), would not be actionable under the statute. Nor is it
likely that Motschenbacher's race car, Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), or Bert Lahr's voice, Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st
Cir. 1962), would be an "image" that constitutes a "likeness" deserving relief under the
Tennessee statute.
160. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
161. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
162. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
163. "[M]uch confusion shrouds the so-called right of publicity, largely because it has
often been discussed under the rubric right of privacy." 579 F.2d 215 at 220.
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trict court opinion in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.164 In Price
the court held that commercial exploitation rights to the personae
of the comedic creations Laurel and Hardy were assignable and de-
scendible.'6 5 Relying on Haelan6 6 and approving the district
court's language in Price, the Factors I court again "recognized
that the right of publicity exists independent from the [New York]
statutory right of privacy and that it can be validly transferred by
its owner. ' 167 Noting that Presley had in fact exploited his com-
mercial rights during his lifetime, the court found that the rights
survived Presley's death and did not deal with the question
whether the exploitation conditioned the survivability of the
right.168
Although the 1978 Factors I decision appeared to establish
descendibility in New York, it did not end the Presley wars. The
1980 Sixth Circuit opinion in Memphis Development"9 caused the
Second Circuit, in "Factors II, ' 1 7 to reconsider its prior action.
The Factors II court held that, as a matter of choice of law, a New
164. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
165. The court in Price attempted to distinguish the right of publicity from the right
of privacy and, with its focus on the commercial and :'property" aspects of the former,
found that descendibility is the logical conclusion of the analysis:
While much confusion is generated by the notion that the right of publicity emanates
from the classic right of privacy, the two rights are clearly separable. The protection
from intrusion upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and protection from ap-
propriation of some element of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation,
on the other hand, are different in theory and in scope.
In arguing for termination of the right, defendants appear to confuse the two
essentially different concepts, that is, the traditional right of privacy which clearly ter-
minates upon death of the person asserting such a right and the right of publicity
which we think does not terminate upon death.
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the statutory
right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclusion to any
such claim. In addition, based upon the same theoretical foundation, such a right of
privacy is not assignable during life. When determining the scope of the right of public-
ity, however, one must take into account the purely commercial nature of the protected
right .. . .There appears to be no logical reason to terminate this right upon death of
the person protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has
been deemed a "property right."
Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
166. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
167. 579 F.2d at 220-21.
168. Id. at 222 n.11.
169. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980); see supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
170. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 927 (1982).
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York court deciding the case would apply Tennessee law.171 The
court further concluded that, absent state authority, it should treat
the Sixth Circuit opinion as expounding Tennessee law and follow
that opinion.172 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that commer-
cial exploitation rights in the Presley persona were not descendi-
ble.1 7s The battle continued into 1983 as the Second Circuit '174 was
asked to consider the impact on its Factors 11 holding of the post-
Memphis Development contradictory Tennessee Chancery Court
rulings on descendibility.17 5 The court refused to reconsider its
prior decision. 1 7
C. The New York Paradox
With respect to New York law, the tortuous road to
descendibility continued after Factors L In Hicks v. Casablanca
Records177 in which Agatha Christie's estate asserted claims aris-
ing out of a purportedly fictional account of an episode in the late
author's life, the federal district court followed Factors I in holding
that "the right in the publicity value of one's name or likeness, is a
valid property right which is transferable and capable of surviving
the death of the owner."17 8 The Hicks court further understood
Factors I to require lifetime commercial exploitation - which the
court found to have occurred - as a condition to survivability. 79
171. Id. at 281.
172. Id. at 281-82.
173. Judge Mansfield dissented, arguing vigorously that "the Factors I approach [is]
the appropriate rule for Tennessee just as for New York." 652 F.2d at 288 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
174. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
175. See Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2204 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1981) (upholding descendibility); Lancaster v. Factors Etc., Inc., 9
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1982) (denying descendibility). The matter
reached the court prior to the Tennessee Court of Appeals' effective reversal of Coors in
1984. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
176. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983). Judge Mansfield
again dissented, arguing that the conflict in Tennessee "provides an additional reason for
... following the usual practice, where we disagree with the reasoning of another circuit
.... of deciding a case according to what we believe to be the more rational basis." Id. at
13. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). All told, from 1978 to 1983, the litigation between Factors
Etc. and Pro Arts in the New York federal courts over the issue of descendibility consumed
three Court of Appeals and four District Court opinions: 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); 541 F. Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); 562 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
177. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
178. Id. at 429.
179. Id. at 429-30.
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The Hicks exploitation requirement (which the Georgia Supreme
Court dismissed as dicta in Martin Luther King, Jr.5 0) essentially
was disregarded by the federal district court in New York in
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co.181
Groucho Marx Productions involved an attempt by the heirs
of each of the Marx Brothers to enjoin performance of a theatrical
comedy whose principal device was to present a Chekhov play as it
might have been performed by the Marx Brothers. The district
court, relying on Haelan'82 and Factors ,1s3 found that New York
would recognize a common-law right of publicity distinct from the
state's statutory right of privacy' and found further that the pub-
licity right survives death.8 5 Considering the requirement of life-
time commercial exploitation, the court found that the Marx
Brothers' professional performances, which had created celebrity,
amounted to sufficient exploitation.' 8 By finding satisfaction of
the commercial exploitation requirement'87 simply in the activity
creating celebrity, the court essentially eliminated the requirement
in the act of recognizing it. "The court in effect, collapsed the ex-
ploitation requirement into the broader definition of celebrity sta-
180. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 146, 296 S.E.2d 697, 705-06 (1982); see supra note 105 and accom-
panying text.
181. 523 F. Supp. 485, 490-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317
(2d Cir. 1982).
182. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
183. Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
184. 523 F. Supp. at 487-89.
185. Id. at 489-92.
186.
As a common sense matter, it must be noted that Leo [Chico] and Adolph [Harpo]
Marx, no less than Julius [Groucho, who had made a lifetime transfer of his rights],
earned their livelihoods by exploiting the unique characters they created .... [T]he
Marx Brothers' fame arose as a direct result of their efforts to develop instantly recog-
nizable and popular stage characters, having no relation to their real personalities
.... Every appearance, contract and advertisement involving the Marx Brothers sig-
nified recognition by the performers of the commercial value of unique characters they
portrayed. To suggest . . . that the right of publicity was not exploited because the
Marx Brothers did not endorse dance studios, candy bars or tee shirts is wholly
illogical.
Id. at 491-92.
187. Other courts had understood the requirement to mean commercial use by the
celebrity other than the activity that made him or her famous. See, e.g., Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 146,
296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982).
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tus."''1s On appeal 18 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on the ground that a New York court would have ap-
plied California law, rather than New York law,190 and that the
California decisions' 91  required a determination of nonde-
scendibility.19 2
From high comedy to drama, the New York saga of
descendibility was played at last before a New York appellate
court in 1984 as a Tennessee Williams production, in Southeast
Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence. 93 The plaintiff, representing the estate of
Tennessee Williams, sought to enjoin the defendant, a theatre
owner, from renaming his theatre the "Tennessee Williams." The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant wanted "to trade ... upon
the popularity, good will and high standards of dramatic excellence
created by the efforts and achievements of Tennessee Williams' 94
and not simply, as the defendant claimed, "to honor the memory
and contributions of one of America's greatest playwrights.' 95 To
the court, the question of the right of publicity's descendibility was
a "novel issue." 196
The court, focusing on the "property" interest, distinguished
the right of publicity from the right of privacy 97 and found a com-
mon-law right of publicity distinct from the New York statutory
188. Note, The Right of Publicity Revisited: Reconciling Fame, Fortune, and Consti-
tutional Rights, 62 B.U.L. REV. 965, 991 (1982) (footnote omitted).
189. Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
190. Id. at 320. See also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
191. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr.
352 (1979).
192. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
193. 104 A.D.2d 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 66
N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
194. Id. at 215, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 213, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
197.
Unlike the right of privacy, which has been recognized as a personal right, in that it
protects a person's "right to be let alone," the right of publicity has been recognized as
a property right, in that "there is no question but that a celebrity has a legitimate
proprietary interest in his public personality."
There can be no dispute that "Tennessee Williams" had a valuable property right
in his name.
104 A.D.2d at 216, 219, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 221, 223 (quoting Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (App. Div. 1977)) (citations and
footnote omitted).
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right of privacy. "[O]ur analysis of the legal authorities convinces
us that there is a common-law right of publicity in New York, and,
that it is a property right, and, as such is descendible." 198 More-
over, the court held unequivocally that descendibility of the right
is not conditioned upon any form of lifetime commercial exploita-
tion: "Although we find that Williams exploited his right of public-
ity when he was alive, we hold that there was no prerequisite for
Williams to have exercised this right when he was alive .... 19s
In a concurring opinion Justice Sandler expressed concern
over the need to rely upon an array of federal court decisions, with
which he agreed on the merits,20 0 to find a New York right of pub-
licity and over the issue of statutory preemption in New York.0 1
He attempted to justify the result "on a more limited ground, al-
though one difficult to fit into a familiar legal category .... It is
surely an unacceptable proposition that the death of a major
American dramatist should be regarded as a license to theatre
owners to appropriate his name for commercial purposes by affix-
ing it to the name of a theatre. 20 2
Justice Sandler's concern proved to be well founded. One week
after the release of the Appellate Division's opinion in Southeast
Bank, the New York Court of Appeals held in Stephano v. News
Group Publications, Inc.20 3 that New York does not recognize an
independent common-law right of publicity distinct from the stat-
utory right of privacy.20 4 Stephano did not involve questions of as-
signability or descendibility, and the court specifically noted that it
198. 104 A.D.2d at 219, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 223 (footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 218-19, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
200. "In the absence of any authoritative New York decision clearly to the contrary, it
seems to me appropriate to give persuasive weight to this carefully considered body of opin-
ions. The basic principles set forth in them seem to me clearly sound. . . ... Id. at 220, 483
N.Y.S.2d at 224 (Sandler, J., concurring).
201.
The critical question before us is whether the right of publicity as it has been devel-
oped is so closely related to the right sought to be protected in sections 50 and 51 of
the Civil Rights Law, that these sections should be deemed to preclude the acceptance
of this separate common-law right. As to this issue, I acknowledge some uncertainty as
to whether the statutory sections, which in terms prohibit the commercial or trade
exploitation without consent of a person's name, picture or portrait, are correctly con-
strued to permit a separate and distinct common-law cause of action on behalf of those
whose name and picture have an established commercial value.
Id. at 220-21, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (Sandier, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 221, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (Sandier, J., concurring).
203. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
204. Id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224; see supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
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"need not consider" the impact of its decision on these matters.10 5
Nevertheless, the court's refusal to find a common-law right of
publicity distinct from the statutory right of privacy and the ex-
press limitation of the New York statute °0 to living persons 0 7
would appear to mandate the conclusion that in New York today
the heirs or assignees of a deceased celebrity may not maintain an
action for the commercial exploitation of the celebrity's name or
likeness. The New York Court of Appeals could have resolved any
doubt in its subsequent review of Southeast Bank; instead it chose
to apply Florida law to reverse the Appellate Division holding of
descendibility and expressly declined to "pass upon the question of
whether a common law descendible right of publicity exists in
[New York]. ' 205
D. Descendiblity in Perspective
The issue of descendibility seems to have come full circle. Un-
til Stephano there appeared to be a general judicial tendency to
separate the right of publicity from its privacy antecedent and to
recognize the economic exploitation right as proprietary rather
than personal.20 9 In this context descendibility logically and judi-
205. "In view of the fact that the plaintiff is asserting his own right of publicity we
need not consider whether the statute would also control assignment, transfer or descent of
publicity rights." 64 N.Y.2d at 183 n.2, 474 N.E.2d at 584 n.2, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 n.2.
206. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1986).
207. See Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
208. Southeast Bank v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498
N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985) (mem.). Although the lower courts and the parties had assumed
that New York law was dispositive, the Court of Appeals found Florida law to be control-
ling, in view of Tennessee William's status as a Florida domicillary at his death. Florida's
"descendibility" statute (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West 1972), grants rights only to a
surviving spouse, surviving children, and authorized licensees.
Stephano's logic seemingly compels the conclusion of nondescendibility in New York.
An alternative, albeit strained, construction is possible, however. Arguably, the New York
statute preempts only a purported common-law claim precisely coextensive with the statute
(i.e., a living person's claim arising out of another's unsanctioned use of the person's name,
portrait or picture), but not a claim whose elements fall outside the statute. A construction
that allows for the creation of a common-law right when the circumstances do not fit pre-
cisely within the statute is less probable than one that upholds statutory exclusivity for all
purposes. Such a construction, however, would meet the serious problems that Stephano
has created, see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text, and still retain a common-law
flexibility rather than require a precise, limiting statutory solution.
209. As an English commentator has observed: "A well developed line of cases . . .
and the bulk of American literature now distinguish the appropriation of a private person's
personality from that of a celebrity or public figure." Frazer, supra note 3, at 308. See supra
notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
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cially was compelled.210 From the direct holdings in Lugosi and
Guglielmi in California and Memphis Development in Tennessee
and inferentially from the logic of Stephano in New York, how-
ever, descendibility, as a common-law proposition, appears to have
been rejected judicially in the principal jurisdictions having the
most concern with the celebrity-based right of publicity. 11
The recent cases212 and the statutory responses in California213
and Tennessee 214 seem to have eliminated the epicycle of "lifetime
exploitation," which courts and commentators built on to the cos-
mology of descendibility. Commentators had suggested that post
mortem right of publicity actions be limited to assignees who had
purchased their interests during the celebrity's lifetime, 15 that a
subsisting contractual arrangement specifically dealing with com-
mercial exploitation be a condition to survivability,216 or that evi-
dence of the celebrity's "personal commercialization" be required
before recognizing a post mortem right.2 "1 For the courts and the
legislatures, however, lifetime exploitation is not now a relevant
factor in determining whether the right of publicity dies with the
210. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see
also Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Factors Etc.,
Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc., v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135,
296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
211. But cf. Acme Circus Operating Co., 711 F.2d at 1538 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed California law as recognizing descendibility
when there has been lifetime commercial exploitation. Nevertheless, Georgia appears to be
the only state whose highest court has recognized descendibility as a common-law right. See
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982). Cf. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1235
(N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd. 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that "under Ohio law, the right
of publicity, like the right of privacy, is not descendible"). Judge Posner's observation in
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 1489 (1986), that the right of publicity is "the commercial-appropriation branch of the
right of privacy" may portend a similar result in the Seventh Circuit.
212. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Company, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296
S.E.2d 697 (1982). But cf. Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th
Cir. 1983).
213. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
215. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 1009.
216. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 76, at 1130-31.
217. See Rader, supra note 4, at 229.
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celebrity.
Nor should lifetime exploitation be relevant.218 In effect, such
a requirement would serve to fragment further a juridical concept
that is sorely in need of unification. There is, as the Supreme
Court of Georgia noted, a patent absurdity in protecting all celeb-
rities during their lifetimes, but, after their deaths, creating sub-
classes of celebrities and protecting only those who engaged in
some activity other than that which initially gave rise to the right
of publicity.219 To recognize a right of publicity for a celebrity is to
recognize a distinct, peculiar interest. To recognize or to refuse rec-
ognition of that right after the celebrity's death is essentially to
make a policy determination, a decision as to societal limitation on
that interest. The commercial conduct of the celebrity does not de-
fine his right of publicity, which derives from his existence as a
celebrity, 220 and therefore should not be part of that policy deter-
mination, which is predicated not on the interest of the celebrity,
but on societal values.
A certain moral repugnance attaches to the posthumous com-
mercialization of fame,221 and a predisposition exists toward exten-
sion of the public domain.222 In postulating the kind of society we
might like - one in which fame does not have economic value
apart from the activity that creates the notoriety -however, we
should not blind ourselves to reality. If the sole policy considera-
218. See Kwall, supra note 3, at 217-26; Sims, supra note 3, at 480-81; Hoffman, supra
note 3, at 44.
219. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 147, 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (1982).
220. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Undoubtedly, Elvis
Presley could have recovered damages from one who sold tee shirts with his picture on the
front, even if Presley at that time had not entered into any commercial exploitation con-
tracts. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). Similarly, an adver-
tiser's violation of Bert Lahr's right of publicity by imitating Lahr's voice in a commercial
was not dependent on Lahr's previously having made commercials. See Lahr v. Adell Chem-
ical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
221. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 76:
[T]he growth of intellectual property in recent years has been uncontrolled to the point
of recklessness ... [R]ecognition of new intellectual property interests should be offset
... by equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in the public domain.
[In] numerous instances exclusive rights have been r3cognized in contenders
who simply have not demonstrated a legitimate claim.
Id at 147, 153. Lange, however, rather cavalierly dismisses the contrary judicial approach
with his assertion that "[t]rial judges' opinions in matters of this sort are notoriously apt to
be foolish or bourgeois or both or worse." Id. at 164.
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tion were the public's right to benefit from that fame whose very
existence comes from public participation, the right of publicity
should terminate upon the death of the celebrity. The conjectural
possibility that the prospect of passing subsidiary commercializa-
tion rights on to the next generation may motivate artistic creativ-
ity22' hardly should offset the claims of the public.
The focus on the public misconceives both the interest that
the right of publicity protects and the reality of the public use.
There is less to the descendibility of the right of publicity than
meets the eye; the simplicity of the issue is lost in a forest of com-
peting dogma. The real question to ask one who connects a de-
ceased celebrity's persona with a commercial undertaking is, "Why
are you doing it?" The purveyor of a Presley tee shirt is not selling
tee shirts, he is selling Presley. He does it because he can make
money out of the Presley persona. There is a limited market for
tee shirts carrying the likeness of a Williston or a Corbin, whatever
society's sartorial needs; there is a substantial market, however
transitory, for a Presley, a Groucho Marx, or a Woody Allen.
In short, it is hard to find a public benefit from any commer-
cial exploitation.224 The dispute is not between the celebrity's idle
heirs and the public at large, a dispute in which strong policy con-
siderations would favor the public. Rather, the competition is
among scavengers seeking to trade on the economic value of the
deceased. Perhaps any resolution of this dispute necessarily en-
riches one of the participants "unjustly." Logic and fairness, how-
ever, seem to compel favoring the scavenger who has some colora-
ble connection to the deceased. If there is any public interest at all
in the commercialization of fame, the interest lies in avoiding un-
fairness and unjust enrichment within the universe of the compet-
ing commercial interests.22 5 The right of publicity, therefore, must
be freely descendible. 6
The horrific scenario of some perpetual right under which the
223. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846-47, 603 P.2d 425,
445-46, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 343-44 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 145-46, 296
S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982); see also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 76, at 1130-31; Kwall supra
note 3, at 212; Note, supra note 35, at 547.
224. But cf. Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971).
225. Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 148-52, 296 S.E.2d 697, 706-09 (1982) (Weltner, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 145, 296 S.E.2d at 705; Hoffman, supra note 3, at 44; Kwall, supra note 3,
at 211-17, 228.
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remote heirs of Dolly Madison would be double dipping into the
ice cream business is largely academic. 227 The courts have not hesi-
tated to dispose of remote heirs228 or to determine the legitimacy
of claims; the possibility of a lapse of the right by lack of use and
similar matters are grist for the common-law mill. The appropriate
question, again, is why does the user use the persona of one who is
deceased? If in a given case there is enduring economic-as op-
posed to public-value in a use of the persona, then the heirs and
assignees should have a greater claim than the stranger.229 In any
event, a duration rule that recognizes that the right is linked to the
continued value of the deceased's persona is more consistent with
the nature of the interest than is an arbitrary cutoff period.80
It is unfortunate that the post mortem aspect of the right of
publicity has been the focus of judicial and legislative activity for
the past several years, while the right itself remains not clearly ar-
ticulated. Courts', legislatures', and commentators' recent concen-
tration on descendibility has diverted the development of the right
into tortuous paths and literal dead ends that may lead to more ill-
conceived legislation and further judicial conflict. The piecemeal
legislative response in California s' very well may be echoed by
similar fragmentary legislation in New York that further impedes
the orderly judicial development of the right of publicity in its
entirety.
To say that the right of publicity should or should not be de-
scendible presupposes a shared understanding of the nature and
scope of the right. That understanding, rather than the peripheral
question of descendibility, is the significant inquiry. Such an in-
quiry requires appropriate analytic tools to define the interest and
to formulate a coherent policy that sets the boundaries of
protectability.
227. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, n.31, 603 P.2d 425, 447 n.31,
160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 345 n.31 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
228. See, e.g., Schumann v. Loew's, Inc., 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Note, supra
note 35, at 547-48.
229. Indeed, the Tennessee statute indirectly approaches the matter in this way by
extending the duration of the right beyond the initial ten year period following death to
make the right essentially coterminous with continued exploitation. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-25-1104(b) (1984).
230. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 3, at 252-53; Ropski, Further Comments on the
Development of the Right of Publicity-A Matter of Life, Death, and Sometimes the First
Amendment, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 278, 283-84 (1984).
231. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text and text following note 134.
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IV. ANALYTIC TOOLS
A. Property and Value
Conceptually, the effort to separate the right of publicity from
its privacy mooring and the dispute as to the right's nature and
extent have revolved around the issue of "property": is the right
personal to an individual, an emotional extension of his personal-
ity, or does the right represent a form of property with the attrib-
utes attendant to that label?2 32 Thus, if one may define the right as
a property right, then one can be quite comfortable with the idea
of such a right being assignable, survivable, descendible, and even
taxable or capable of division in a divorce proceeding.233 If, rather,
the right is personal and not in the nature of property, then the
right clearly may be made the subject of license or waiver, but can-
not have independent, exclusive, alienable, or divisible
characteristics.23 4
Some have suggested that this debate over the right's nature is
"pointless. ' 23 5 Certainly the debate is circular, but that should not
obscure the fact that the debate is part of an attempt to grasp
something elusive that is unique to modern society. It has been
said that if one's only tool is a hammer, then a nail quickly be-
comes the solution to every problem. The label of "property" has
proven to be a useful nail, and perhaps we do our circumlocutions
around the shibboleth of "property" because we at least can under-
stand it in some other context. Now, however, we require different
analytic tools and materials to build coherent structures capable of
232. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 455-65; Frazer supra note 3, at 300-07 (dis-
cussing both classical property theory and the "property" concept applied to the right of
publicity); Lange, supra note 76; Shipley, supra note 3, at 673 ("Individuals have legitimate
proprietary claims to their publicity interests.").
233. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1593; see Donenfeld, supra note 76, at 21-22;
Rader, supra note 4, at 228-29, 234; cf. Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969);
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Many courts
have recognized, as a property right, a person's use of his or her name and likeness.");
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-83 (D. Minn. 1970); Ausness, supra note
6, at 977-78 ("recognition value"); see supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
234. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 329 (1979); see supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
235. 25 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329; Prosser, supra note
23, at 406. But cf. Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (11th
Cir. 1983) (noting that the distinction is significant in resolving choice of law issues). More-
over, a determination of whether the claim for violation of one's right of publicity is a per-
sonal or a property claim may be significant in determining the taxability of the judgment
recovered. Cf. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding defama-
tion damages to be referable to a personal injury and therefore not taxable).
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supporting the interests involved in the right of publicity and the
other personality interests in our mass-communications-dominated
world.
One useful tool that appears to avoid the "property" circle is
the concept of "value." Relief for the celebrity whose persona has
been appropriated for a commercial endorsement is supported by
the proposition that the celebrity, by dint of effort or luck, has
created in his or her personality a marketable economic value dis-
tinguishable from the emotional value of identity.3 6 The concept
of value is intuitively satisfying.2 7 Our society does recognize that
certain people, whom we call celebrities, specifically affect the mar-
ketability of goods, services, and creative works.23 s The advertising
agency that used a model closely resembling Jacqueline Onassis in
a television advertisement associating well-known people with its
client's products23 9 believed that Mrs. Onassis, as an identifiable
person, specifically would enhance the marketability of that prod-
236. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977);
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
237.
It is not clear that traditional and current concepts of the role of property would sup-
port the idea of recognizing property in personality. Other reasons exist, however, to
support an argument for giving control over the use of personality to the individual
concerned . . . . A market in personalities exists and so, therefore, do market values.
Frazer, supra note 3, at 304; see Donenfeld, supra note 76, at 21-22. "While not all courts
agree that there is a property right attached to a right of privacy, there is a growing accept-
ance of the fact that a value can be given a name, or a personality." Id. Lange, supra note
76, has suggested that the use of "value" is another exercise in circularity, that there is
"value" only if a court says that someone must pay for the unauthorized use:
The chief attribute of intellectual property is that apart from its recognition in
law it has no existence of its own. . . . It is sometimes said that the right of publicity
rests on the commercial value of the interest itself, but that explanation is nonsense
without something more. A claim of this sort will have commercial value only if it also
has the protection of the law. In a sense, the value of this property stems from the fact
that the law recognizes it and protects it .... Certainly, [the recognition and protec-
tion of a right] cannot legitimately turn on anything as simple as a proposition about
where the economic value of the interests reside; they reside wherever the law permits
them to reside.
Id. at 147, 160, 164 (footnotes omitted). Lange ignores the economic realities of the commer-
cial marketplace. IBM uses the Charlie Chaplin "little tramp" to enhance computer sales.
IBM may pay for that use even if the law does not clearly compel it to do so, and it derives
value from that use even if it does not pay for it.
238. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 555-57; see also Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.10 (9th Cir. 1974) ("It would be wholly unrealistic to deny
that a name, likeness, or other attribute of identity can have commercial value.").
239. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254
(Sup. Ct. 1984).
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uct.240 Nothing fortuitous was involved here; it was a commercial,
economic calculation to associate Mrs. Onassis with a product.
Should one then ask if there is "value" in Mrs. Onassis' per-
sonality? Is it merely the fact that a court chose to grant her relief
that makes her personality valuable? Hardly. The advertiser had
at least a colorable right to use any model it chose in an advertise-
ment and well may have been advised that the use of a model re-
sembling Mrs. Onassis would not subject the agency to liability. In
simple terms, the agency used Mrs. Onassis' likeness precisely be-
cause the advertiser believed that associating her with the product
would be good for the product's marketability. Celebrity is worth
something in the marketplace. 241 Celebrity is marketable both for
itself directly and for the associative spillover that follows from our
interest in celebrity.
From Mrs. Onassis' viewpoint, however, the injury here may
be more in the nature of an assault, an attack on her privacy inter-
est, as the New York court held. The court declined to discuss
whether she, as a person who most emphatically has not allowed
direct commercial exploitation of her personality, had a right of
publicity upon which the advertiser had impinged. 242 The defend-
ant, however, most assuredly sought to derive economic market
benefit from the calculated use of Mrs. Onassis' likeness.
B. Deception: The Lanham Act
Allen v. National Video24' is one court's attempt to avoid the
privacy linkage and the property circle by focusing on the appro-
priator's act rather than the celebrity's interest using section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act 244 as a basis for affording relief to a celebrity
240. Conversely, the merchant who used Ms. Roberson's picture to advertise flour
merely believed that associating its product graphically with an anonymous consumer would
help sales. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The
maker of toiletries that sought nude mother and daughter forms for its advertisement was
not particularly interested in Mrs. Cohen and her daughter as recognizable personalities.
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984).
241. "[Tlhe Court can take judicial notice that there is a fairly active market for
exploitation of the faces, names and reputations of celebrities." Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367
F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See Frazer, supra note 3, at 304 ("A market in personali-
ties exists and so, therefore, do market values."); Shipley, supra note 3, at 673 ("It is eco-
nomic reality that pecuniary value is inherent in publicity.").
242. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d
254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984); cf. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
243. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). That section provides:
Any person who shall . . . use in connection with any goods or services . . . a false
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whose identity has been commercially appropriated. There, noting
that the Act's scope is not limited to traditional trademark or un-
fair competition claims, Judge Motley found that the Act extends
to the protection of a celebrity's "commercial investment in the
drawing power of his or her name and face in endorsing products
and in marketing a career .... The underlying purposes of the
Lanham Act. .. appear to be implicated in cases of misrepresen-
tations regarding the endorsement of goods and services. "245
The Lanham Act approach to the protection of a celebrity's
interest in the exploitation of his or her persona represents a paral-
lel thread in the development of the right of publicity. This ap-
proach invokes concepts of "unfair competition" to protect against
an advertiser's appropriation of "good will" in the celebrity's iden-
tity and applies the trademark analogy. The focus of this ap-
proach, however, is not on the celebrity's interest in the economic
value of his identity, but on the public interest in freedom from
deception.4 6 Paradigmatic of unfair competition in this context is
the 1928 action in which Charlie Chaplin enjoined a filmmaker
from using the name "Charlie Aplin" and imitating Chaplin's dis-
tinctive "little tramp" in a motion picture. The California court
emphasized that
[Charlie Chaplin's] case ... does not depend on his right to the exclusive use
of the role, garb, and mannerisms, etc.; it is based upon fraud and deception.
The right of action in such a case arises from the fraudulent purpose and
conduct of appellant and injury caused to the plaintiff thereby, and the
deception to the public, and it exists independently of the law regulating
trade-marks, or of the ownership of such trade-marks or trade-names by
plaintiff. It is plaintiff's right to be protected against those who would injure
him by fraudulent means: that is, by counterfeiting his role-or, in other
words, plaintiff has the right to be protected against "unfair competition in
business. 2 8
Although unfair competition standing alone is of limited util-
ity as a basis for the right of publicity because the concept requires
designation of origin, or any false description or representation ... tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce ... shall be liable to a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id.
245. 610 F. Supp. at 625-26.
246. As Judge Motley noted, "[a]pplication of the [Lanham] act is limited . . .to
potential deception which threatens economic interests analogous to those protected by
trademark law." Id. at 625 (citing Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 601 F.2d
631 (2d Cir. 1979)).
247. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
248. Id. at 363, 269 P. at 546.
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the existence of "competition, 2 49 the confluence of the elements of
deception with a celebrity's quasi-trademark interest in "good
will" makes the Lanham Act an appealing tool for protection of
the celebrity's identity interest.2 50 It is essential to a Lanham Act
claim, however, that the particular use create a "likelihood of con-
fusion" with respect to the source of the product or the endorse-
ment.251 Indeed, confusion exists about the nature and degree of
"confusion" required to make out a Lanham Act claim. 52 Never-
theless, a Lanham Act, trademark-related, or unfair competition
claim requires a "likelihood of confusion" as to some matter signif-
icant in the presentation of the goods or services.253
The Lanham Act arguably protects a celebrity against an-
other's unauthorized exploitation of the celebrity's identity, 54
avoids the privacy linkage, and "federalizes" a claim peculiarly re-
lated to mass communications. The "likelihood of confusion" test,
with its emphasis on deception, however, deflects the Lanham Act
remedy from the real interests implicated in an unauthorized ap-
propriation of a celebrity's economically valuable identity. The test
simply disregards the complexities of the associative value of a ce-
lebrity's identity. Only through a flexible common-law right of
publicity can courts protect these interests.
C. Associative Value
The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value. A
celebrity's persona confers an associative value, or economic im-
pact, upon the marketability of a product. Whether we like com-
mercialization of personality or not,255 the economic reality per-
249. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 6, at 983-85; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 210-14.
250. "[T]he unauthorized use of a person's name or photograph in a manner that cre-
ates the false impression that the party has endorsed a product or service in interstate com-
merce violates the Lanham Act." Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
251. Id. at 627-29; Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("[The Lanham Act] and unfair competition law in general, function primarily to
protect consumers from confusion as to the source of goods in the market.").
252. Cf. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1012-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Nat'l Bank of Com-
merce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 541-42 (W.D.Texas 1980).
253. See, e.g., Cifelli & McMurray, supra note 8; Heneghan & Wamsley, supra note 8;
Note, supra note 8.
254. In Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), Judge Motley
suggests that a statutory approach to the problems Stephano presents be modeled on the
Lanham Act. Id. at 624 n.5.
255. Cf. Lange, supra note 76. "Fame is not inconsistent with merit but neither is it
evidence of merit." Id. at 163. "To be sure, the Marx Brothers became celebrities as most
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sists. Consumers are prepared to pay for Elvis Presley tee shirts;
they pay for a Presley likeness, not simply for a garment. In that
sense the Presley persona's "value" is demonstrably present, irre-
spective of whether a court determines that the vendor must2 56 or
need not257 pay the Presley estate.258 At a higher level of sophisti-
cation, when a tobacco company's advertising agency deliberately
chooses to feature in a cigarette advertisement a racing car painted
to resemble the car used by a well-known driver, 59 the agency does
so in the belief that the public's association of the driver with the
cigarette will enhance cigarette sales.
The market place recognizes an associative economic value.260
The courts, when they deal with the right of publicity, do not cre-
ate value. Rather, as a matter of policy, the courts determine the
extent to which one must compensate the person who has gener-
ated the economic value for use of the persona and the limits of
the celebrity's control over the exploitation of his or her
personality.
What the courts must consider is the evocation of identity.
vaudevillians did not. But surely we are not rewarding them on that ground alone." Id. at
162.
256. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
257. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
258. Indeed, the idea that recognizability itself can enhance a sale has been brought to
a metaphysical peak by the American Express advertising campaign that uses the non-rec-
ognizability of the face of a person whose name is well known as a means of associating that
name with the American Express credit card.
259. See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
260.
Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise commercial services
and products or ... even have their identities infused in the products. Individuals
prominent in athletics, business, entertainment and the arts ... are frequently in-
volved in such enterprises. When a product's promoter determines that the commercial
use of a particular person will be advantageous, the promoter is often willing to pay
handsomely for the privilege. As a result, the sale of one's persona in connection with
the promotion of commercial products has unquestionably become big business.
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the value or
sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the product and thereby
siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity's persona into the
product.
.[T]he marketable product ... is the ability of a person's name or likeness to
attract the attention and evoke a desired response in a particular consumer audience.
That response is a kind of good will or recognition value generated by that person. .
While this product is concededly intangible, it is not illusory.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834-35, 603 P.2d 425, 437-38, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 335-36 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Identity routinely is evoked through the use of a name or a clear
likeness. Sophisticated advertising techniques, however, are not de-
pendent upon such literal appropriation. To associate a product
with the then well-known Guy Lombardo required only a particu-
lar musical arrangement in a New Year's Eve setting, and not the
conductor's name or an actor who resembled him.2 61 The use of a
distinctively striped racing car was designed to associate an unseen
and unnamed, but well-known, driver with a brand of cigarettes. 2
An imitation of a well-known voice, with no other identification,
can be sufficient to create an association between the celebrity and
a commercial product.63
In none of these cases could one truly say that the advertiser
had used the "name" or "likeness" of a specific person. Neverthe-
less, advertisers undoubtedly use other, perhaps peripheral, attrib-
utes of celebrities commercially in order to associate advertised
products with well-known people and thereby to enhance the prod-
ucts' marketability. Indeed, very little may be needed to create
such an association. The imitation need not be a good one to evoke
the celebrity's image; nor is it material whether the use is compli-
mentary, derogatory, or neutral. The exploitation interest of celeb-
rity-the right of publicity-transcends the literal name or like-
ness.264 The specific manner in which the advertiser evokes a
particular celebrity's persona and associates that persona with a
commercial enterprise should not determine the degree to which a
court will protect or limit the celebrity's interest.265 The associative
261. See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(App. Div. 1977).
262. See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
263. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., Inc., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive, Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
264. As the court pointed out in Carson V. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698
F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983):
It is our view that, under the existing authorities, a celebrity's legal right of public-
ity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial pur-
poses .... It is not fatal to appellant's claim that appellee did not use his "name."
Indeed, there would have been no violation of his right of publicity even if appellee had
used his name, such as "J. William Carson Portable Toilet" or the "John William Car-
son Portable Toilet" or the "J.W. Carson Portable Toilet." The reason is that, though
literally using appellant's "name," the appellee would not have appropriated Carson's
identity as a celebrity. Here there was an appropriation of Carson's identity without
using his "name."
Id. at 837.
265. "Property rights in personality are only justifiable in economic terms where they
attach not to the name or image per se, but to the value generated by those indicia of
personality. . . .The property right should ...attach to the goodwill generated by the
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value of celebrity is a subtle and sophisticated concept that is not
addressed by analyses predicated either on public confusion or on
specifically enumerated attributes of a persona.
In Allen v. National Video the court suggests that an adver-
tiser permissibly may use a "look-alike" if a complete and suffi-
ciently legible disclaimer of identity and endorsement accompanies
the advertisement.2 "8 The suggestion presupposes that the value
derived from evoking the image of Woody Allen in connection with
the promotion of a videotape rental business comes from a public
misconception that Mr. Allen has participated in the promotion,
either directly or by consenting to the impersonation.87 The mat-
ter is not circumscribed so easily.
Consider the Belgian surrealist artist Rene Magritte, who enti-
tled his still life painting of a pipe resting in an ashtray, "Ceci
n'est pas une pipe." Certainly, as the title makes clear, "this is not
a pipe." Whatever the artist's philosophical purpose, it is neverthe-
less a pipe that we see, and the disclaimer serves to focus our at-
tention on the pipe. What would be the effect in the Allen case of
a clear notice that the person pictured in fact is not Mr. Allen and
that Mr. Allen has not endorsed the advertisement or the product?
Indeed, one might imagine an elaborate advertisement built
around a photograph of a "look-alike" with a caption reading:
"This is not Woody Allen. Woody Allen doesn't know we are run-
ning this ad, and he doesn't like our product."
There hardly could be a stronger disclaimer; there hardly
could be a claim of deception or confusion. Yet can there be any
doubt that the advertiser has evoked Woody Allen, qua celebrity,
to direct attention to the ad and thereby to enhance sales? If the
disclaimer is used so clearly that there is no confusion or decep-
tion, why then is the impersonation used at all? The answer goes
beyond "entertainment" value. The advertiser has an opportunity
for a profitable recursiveness, an effect similar to that attempted
by an advertiser who, in seeking to give stature to his product, de-
personality." Frazer, supra note 3, at 307.
266. 610 F. Supp. at 629. In a subsequent contempt proceeding arising out of further
use of the same look-alike but with a small print disclaimer, Allen v. National Video, No.
84-2764 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the court
determined that the defendant's advertisements violated the spirit of the order, but con-
cluded that the advertisements were not strictly violative of the letter of the mandate. In
the court's opinion, the order was inherently ambiguous. The decision does not change the
court's holding that an advertiser will not violate the Lanham Act if a complete and suffi-
ciently legible disclaimer of identity and indorsement accompanies the advertisement.
267. Id.
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clares in the advertisement that the product is "nationally adver-
tised." A disclaimer that eliminates confusion can itself enhance
the celebrity-based nature of the advertisement; the very act of
disclaiming becomes the act of appropriation.2 68
A television commercial broadcast with the 1985 U.S. Open
tennis matches shows only a tennis umpire squirming in his chair,
while the abrasive voice of an unseen player berates him. Is the
voice an attempted imitation of John McEnroe's voice? Possibly,
but it does not matter. Undoubtedly, the advertiser had evoked
the identity of Mr. McEnroe, and with a degree of success that
would not be diminished by a disclaimer, however prominent or
detailed. The fact that neither Mr. McEnroe's name nor his pic-
ture was used would preclude him from getting relief under New
York law as propounded in Stephano. The mere use of a whiny,
complaining voice probably would be insufficient to support a find-
ing in any jurisdiction that the advertiser had appropriated Mr.
McEnroe's "likeness," and assuming the advertiser had used a suf-
ficient disclaimer, it would be virtually impossible for Mr.
McEnroe to demonstrate the "likelihood of confusion" essential to
a Lanham Act claim.
This is not to suggest that John McEnroe should have a claim
as a result of that commercial, 2 but rather that the advertiser has
associated Mr. McEnroe with the product just as surely as if he
had been identified directly. The evocation of celebrity is itself suf-
ficient to take advantage of the associative value, irrespective of
the surrounding context. That context - a celebrity's direct en-
dorsement or similar "voluntary" participation, or a disclaimer and
negation of such participation - may affect the quantum of the
associative value, but not the value's existence or the reality of the
advertiser's appropriation of that value.
268. Witness the television commercial in which the legend "celebrity impersonation
endorsement" is displayed prominently beneath the image of an individual talking about
the product, thereby facilitating the consumer's association of the product with a public
figure who might not otherwise be readily identifiable. At the logical extreme is the possibil-
ity of a commercial that impersonates no actual celebrity, but that gives the impression, by
means of a "disclaimer," that an impersonation has occurred. The advertiser might accom-
plish his purpose simply by having the viewer concentrate on the commercial in the fruitless
attempt to identify the "celebrity" ostensibly being impersonated. In that case the disem-
bodied idea of celebrity itself provides the associative value.
269. See infra text following note 309.
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V. OF INTERESTS AND POLICY
Although an analysis of the right of publicity based upon as-
sociative value is more satisfactory than one predicated on con-
cepts of property, it is incomplete. The former analysis explains,
for example, why an advertiser wants to associate its product with
Mrs. Onassis, but the analysis neither delineates Mrs. Onassis' own
interest nor distinguishes her interest from the fundamentally dif-
ferent interests of Woody Allen or Elvis Presley. The right of pub-
licity has resisted satisfactory definition because the personality
interest from which the right arises is so intangible and elusive.
Nevertheless, society and the law successfully have rationalized
personality interests in other contexts. For example, defamation
has at its core the highly elusive personality interest in reputation,
the esteem in which one is held by one's community, yet the law of
defamation has evolved vigorously over centuries.
Similarly, many countries outside of the United States long
have recognized the personality interest of artistic integrity - a
creator's "moral right" to ensure the integrity, attribution, and ex-
hibition of his or her creation.2 70 Legislatures in the United States
recently have begun to recognize this interest. 1 The interest is not
"property" in the sense of copyright; rather, "moral right" involves
a recognition that the artist invests his work with a part of himself
- his personality2 72 - and that this personality interest is im-
paired when the work is not attributed to him properly or is
distorted.
The creation of the right of privacy, the right to be let alone,
constituted judicial recognition of the seclusionary personality in-
terest, an interest that is distinct from reputation.273 Although the
270. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940). See Kwall, Copyright and Moral
Rights: Is an American Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985), for a recent analysis
of the "moral right." In France, where the newly emergent equivalent to the right of public-
ity (droit sur l'image) similarly has been confused with a right more akin to the right of
privacy (droit a l'image), the well-established concept of "moral right" (droit moral) has
been suggested as a basis for distinguishing and recognizing a celebrity's independent pecu-
niary exploitation interest (un droit partimonial d'exploitation de sa propre image). Ac-
quarone, L'ambiguite du droit a l'image, 22 Recueil Dalloz 129, 132-36 (June 6, 1985).
271. N.Y. ARTS & CULTURAL AFFARs LAW, §§ 14.51-.59 (McKinney 1984); CAL. CIv.
CODE, § 987-989 (West Supp. 1982); MASS. LAWS ANN., ch. 231, § 85S (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp.). See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
272. Roeder, supra note 270, at 557; Kwall, supra note 270, at 3.
273. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 213-14, 50 S.E. 68, 78 (1905);
Bloustein, Privacy is Dear, supra note 32; Prosser, supra note 19; see supra notes 17-27 and
accompanying text.
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same operative act - publication - may injure both reputation
and privacy interests, the two interests are significantly different.
The right of publicity's emergence links the operative act of publi-
cation with yet a third distinct interest.2 74
The identity of the operative act, the historical link between
the right of privacy and the right of publicity,275 and perhaps the
distaste for the phenomenon of marketable celebrity276 have con-
tributed to confusion in differentiating the exploitation interest.2"7
The right of publicity nevertheless presents a truly distinct
interest:
[E]xcept when it comes to fictional First Amendment commodities like
novels, movies, plays and television dramas, the differences are really quite
clear-the right of privacy and the right of publicity are two different and on
the whole independent rights-constantly confused with each other because
one-the right of privacy-is a negative, you can prevent others from using or
exploiting your name and likeness in connection with commercial products or
services and the other-the right of publicity-is an affirmative right which
you can exercise and permit others to exercise in the realms of commerce
Clearly, trying to define the right of publicity with exactitude opens up a
can of worms . . . .Certainly the courts have not succeeded in doing so.
There is an interest here to be protected and it can be protected without
impairing the First Amendment.27 8
The interest, a kind of "property ... in personality, ' 279 is an
individual's interest in exclusively controlling the exploitation of
his or her identity's associative value. If the unauthorized evoca-
tion of an individual's identity serves to enhance the commercial
value of another's enterprise, then that individual's interest has
been invaded. In terms of the interest, whether the invader di-
rectly appropriates the celebrity's "name or likeness" or uses more
subtle identifiers is unimportant.2 s0 Similarly unimportant is
whether the use purports to be authorized or is accompanied by an
274. An incidental consequence is the virtually automatic pleading of multiple claims
arising from the same publication. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2114 (1985); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258
(1st Cir. 1962); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
275. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 76, at 162-63.
277. See Sims, supra note 3, at 464: "Although the celebrity's commercial interest and
his emotional interest are distinguishable ... it is often less clear whether a court granting
judgment for the celebrity has responded to the privacy claim, the publicity claim, or both."
Id. (footnote omitted).
278. Pilpel, supra note 3, at 262. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 6, at 982. "[T]he right
of privacy does not protect those economic interests covered by the right of publicity." Id.
279. Frazer, supra note 3, at 307.
280. See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
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express disclaimer.28'
Any protection that Lanham Act section 43(a) affords to a ce-
lebrity's economic personality interest in a given case is fortuitous.
The Lanham Act simply is not directed to the protection of that
interest.2 82  So, too, concepts of "privacy" and defamation,
whatever their impact upon a particular appropriation of the ce-
lebrity's identity, cannot shelter the interest involved. A coherent
right of publicity specifically based upon the distinct exploitation
interest is prerequisite to consistent and understandable recogni-
tion and protection of that interest. The right of publicity must be
seen as an independent, self-supporting right and not captive to
privacy, copyright, trademark, or unfair competition analogies.
28 3
The right must be allowed "to rest on its own bottom.
2 84
Understanding and identifying the interest can help courts to
define the right of publicity's boundaries. For example, the troub-
lesome Lugosi 28 5 and Groucho Marx Productions286 cases demon-
strate the difficulties presented when a court asserts a right of pub-
licity without clearly articulating the interests involved. Neither of
these cases truly involves the interests properly comprising the
right of publicity.
As Justice Mosk pointed out in Lugosi,8 7 the real question,
281. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
283.
The strength of an analogical approach is that once the equivalence is established, pre-
viously developed rationales and conclusions can be brought to bear on the new situa-
tion .... But a major difficulty with analogies, derived from precisely the same source
as their strength, is that they tend to impose a mature, elaborated system on what may
well be an unformulated situation. The choice of the analogy may not be fully justifia-
ble, and the analogy's application to the situation may carry with it a misleading cer-
tainty .... [N]one of the analogies of privacy, defamation, or property law seems
correct to apply to the publicity issue ....
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 76, at 1127-28.
284. Ausness, supra note 6, at 1054. As Kwall, supra note 3, has observed:
The right of publicity stands as an independent legal doctrine vindicating important
societal interests. Although certain more established legal theories can provide an alter-
native basis for relief in some right of publicity cases, no other legal theory affords an
equal scope of protection against unauthorized exploitation of an individual's name or
likeness.
Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
285. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
286. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
287. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 825, 603 P.2d 425, 432, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 330 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring).
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irrespective of descendibility, was whether Bela Lugosi had any
right of publicity with respect to the Dracula character. Did the
defendant evoke the identity of Lugosi himself or of a role that the
actor effectively portrayed? If the defendant invaded an interest of
Lugosi, it was not an interest in Lugosi's persona; rather the de-
fendant invaded whatever interest Lugosi may have had in a char-
acter. 28 8 By his performance, Lugosi very well may have created
something distinctive in that character - the "definitive" Dracula.
Moreover, a persuasive argument may be made for the proposition
that such a creative act deserves protection, perhaps in the nature
of a copyright. Whatever the appeal of such an argument for ex-
panding the copyright laws, the argument does not support using
the right of publicity to create a protectable interest.289
In Lugosi Justice Mosk distinguished between an actor's mere
portrayal of a character that someone else created and a per-
former's creation of an "original" character, a distinction that sug-
gests that Julius Marx, as the "creator" of an alter ego, "Groucho
Marx," would have a stronger right of publicity claim with respect
to that character than Bela Lugosi had with respect to Dracula. 90
The federal district court for the Southern District of New York
upheld such a claim in Groucho Marx Productions.291 There is
something appealing in a decision that holds essentially that Ju-
lius, Adolph, and Leonard Marx each created personae, in the form
of Groucho, Harpo, and Chico; that the defendant had appropri-
ated these creations; and that the court would not allow the de-
fendant to take the fruits of another's labor. Is such an act of ap-
propriation, however, properly the subject for application of the
right of publicity? Quite distinct from the question of the extent to
which the individual Marx Brothers "created" the characters,' 92 is
that of the relevance of such creation to the personality interest
that the right of publicity embraces.
For example, if Julius Marx had created a cartoon "Groucho,"
one who copied the cartoon character in the same wholesale man-
ner that the defendant in Groucho Marx Productions copied the
"real" Groucho clearly would be liable for copyright infringe-
288. Id.
289. Id. at 828, 603 P.2d at 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
290. Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330. See supra note 108.
291. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
292. See Lange, supra note 76, at 161-63.
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ment.293 It may be an unfortunate omission from our copyright law
that no copyright protection exists for the real character,94 and it
even may be true that psychologically "Groucho" was a manifesta-
tion of Julius' personality. Nevertheless, to say that appropriation
of the character evokes the creator's identity distorts the personal-
ity interest in an attempt to achieve a result that would be more
appropriate, albeit probably not possible,9 5 under the copyright
laws.296
Just as a court should not use the Lanham Act as a vehicle for
vindicating the personality interest that supports the right of pub-
licity, a court should not use the right of publicity to fill lacunae in
the copyright laws, which are designed to protect a different eco-
nomic interest. The law is disserved by distortion of concepts of
privacy, deception, and unfair competition to achieve what is best
left to an independent right of publicity;29 7 it is disserved equally
by labored distortion of the right of publicity to accommodate the
difficult case. The effect of these distortions is to attenuate the
right, further confuse the interest to be protected, and prevent
consistent development and application of sound policy that deter-
mines the appropriate scope of protection for the interest.
An interest analysis focusing on evocation of identity as an ap-
propriation of personality would exclude from the right of public-
ity the copyright-related forms of appropriation and the appropria-
293. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). See Shipley, supra note 3, at 700.
294. Ausness, supra note 6, at 1020; Shipley, supra note 3, at 700; Comment, supra
note 7, at 798-802.
295. One commentator has suggested that copyright protection could have been
afforded the Marx Brothers under a "derivative work" theory. Note, supra note 7, at 1585.
296. Similarly, some might consider it immoral for IBM to use the Charlie Chaplin
"little tramp" as a significant advertising device to sell computers if IBM did not compen-
sate Chaplin's estate for the use. The legal compulsion attendant to such moral compulsion,
however, should come from the body of law-copyright-designed to protect the outwardly
creative acts, and not from legal concepts related to the economic personality interest.
297. Consider Chief Justice Bird's observation in differentiating the right of publicity
from the right of privacy:
The reasons for affording independent protection for the economic value in one's iden-
tity are substantial and compelling. . . . I am. . . persuaded that an individual's right
of publicity is entitled to the law's protection.
.[T]he interest at stake in most commercial appropriation cases is ill-suited to
protection under the umbrella of the right of privacy . . . . [C]onforming a claim for
the misappropriation of the commercial value in one's identity to the requirements of
the right of privacy requires a procrustean jurisprudence.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 840, 843, 603 P.2d 425, 442, 444, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 340, 342 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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tion of an artistic creation. The interest analysis would render
moot the issue of whether section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976
preempts a claim.2"' The general policy question, however, would
remain: assuming that an appropriation involves an interest prop-
erly embraced by the right of publicity, are there nevertheless rea-
sons for immunizing the use?
When a celebrity is the subject of books, plays, or magazine
and newspaper articles, the author of the particular work certainly
has evoked the celebrity's persona for commercial gain. We have
little difficulty in finding most such "entertainment" and "news-
worthy" uses to be beyond the reach of the right of publicity.299
Policy, primarily first amendment policy, clearly immunizes these
uses, notwithstanding their invasion of the personality interest.
The right of publicity does not outweigh the value of free expres-
sion.300 For the most part, first amendment policy considerations
have little impact on the avowedly commercial appropriation of
identity.301 The cases generally have been consistent in defining
298. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1977). It is generally assumed that "traditional" commercial
appropriation claims are not preempted. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 1015-23. Ausness
notes that "it is doubtful that the celebrity's identity or 'persona'-which is the essence of
the right of publicity-qualifies as a 'work of authorship' within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act." Id. at 1022. See also McLane, supra note 76, at 422-25; cf. Lange, supra note 76,
at 173 (arguing that the right of publicity should be protected narrowly with copyright pre-
emption applied broadly); Note, supra note 7, at 1585-93; see generally, Shipley, supra note
3.
299. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1120 (1982); Ann-Margret v. High Soc. Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485
N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc.2d 1, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), af'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969); cf. Eastwood v.
Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
300. See Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982) ("No action
under [a theory of unauthorized use of name or likeness] will lie . .. solely for publication
which is protected by the First Amendment."); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25
Cal.3d 860, 872, 603 P.2d 454, 461-62, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 359-60 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concur-
ring); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1st Dep't
1980) ("The protection of the right of free expression is so important that we should not
extend any right of publicity. . . to give rise to a cause of action against the publication of a
literary work about a deceased person."); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d
444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Ausness, supra note 6, at 1026-53; Felcher & Rubin,
supra note 3, at 1596-99; Kwall, supra note 3, at 229-53; Note, supra note 35, at 551-57.
301. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). As the
federal district court for the Southern District of New York observed:
As a general rule, if the defendants' works are designed primarily to promote the dis-
semination of thoughts, ideas or information through news or fictionalization, the right
of publicity gives way to protected expression. . . .If, however, the defendants' use of
the celebrity's name or likeness is largely for commercial purposes, such as the sale of
merchandise, the right of publicity prevails."
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the ambit of constitutionally protected dissemination of ideas.
Usually it is not difficult to determine whether a given use of a
celebrity's persona is a constitutionally protected publication pre-
cluding redress under the right of publicity.
Establishing policy to deal with ingenious entrepreneurs who
capitalize upon the associative value of celebrity is more challeng-
ing. Imitation and impersonation, ranging from the meticulous
copying of an entire performance1 2 to the use of a "celebrity look-
alike"3 03 in a commercial advertisement, 30 4 create difficult issues.
In the context of the right of publicity, resolving these issues
should not depend upon a privacy-based determination of whether
the user has appropriated the celebrity's "name or likeness" or any
other specifically enumerated identifier.3 0 5 Rather, the problem in-
volves balancing interests in order to protect the personality inter-
est from appropriation while preserving the equally deserving areas
of parody, satire, and self-conscious impersonation306
The professional impersonator certainly evokes his subject's
persona, but the impersonator3 07 is not so much using the celeb-
rity's associative value as he is calling attention to his own talents
as an impersonator. If a well-known impersonator were to do tele-
vision commercials in which he imitated celebrities, the imitator's
associative value likely would be at least as significant as that of
the celebrities whom he imitated. Sound policy should protect this
use. The patently exploitative "celebrity impersonation endorse-
ment," in which an unidentified individual impersonates a well-
known person, however, is not a showcase for the anonymous im-
personator. Irrespective of any disclaimer or disclosure of the fact
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), reu'd
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); see Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355-61 (D.N.J. 1981). See also McLane, supra note 76, at
425-27; Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1601-06.
302. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
303. Impersonation may be by a "sound-alike" in the case of radio commercials.
304. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Onassis v. Chris-
tian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
305. In Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), Judge
Motley felt constrained by Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 485
N.Y.S.2d 220, 474 N.E.2d 580 (1984), to confine herself to the statutory "privacy" criteria.
Cf. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); see supra
notes 54-58, 65-75, 261-65 and accompanying text.
306. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 3, at 1605.
307. There is, of course, a difference between the casual Elvis Presley impersonator
and the producer of the traveling, elaborate "Big El" show, notwithstanding that both evoke
the identity of Elvis Presley. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J.
1981).
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of impersonation,30 8 the endorsement's primary function is to asso-
ciate the celebrity with the product and to capitalize on that asso-
ciation. There is little reason to shield such an appropriator from
liability.309
Perhaps the most complex policy question arises from appro-
priations involving the use of subtle identifiers that, although inva-
sive of a celebrity's interest, are so far removed from unambiguous
personal identification as to justify exclusion from a workable right
of publicity. For example, while we recognize that a television com-
mercial that uses nothing more than an unseen tennis player's
voice berating an umpire invades John McEnroe's personality in-
terest just as much as an advertiser's use of Mr. McEnroe's photo-
graph to endorse tennis shoes, does sound policy extend the right
of publicity to the former use? Should every commercial use of er-
rantly tuned saxophones playing "Auld Lang Syne" on New Year's
Eve generate a claim by the Lombardo estate?310
Although Mr. McEnroe's pugnacity and on-court vituperation
may identify him (perhaps even more than his considerable skill as
a tennis professional does), the public exposure of this one aspect
of his personality also has served to make him epitomize the argu-
mentative athlete. In that context, an advertiser's use of this attri-
bute to trade on Mr. McEnroe's associative value is secondary to
the advertiser's evocation of the species of athlete Mr. McEnroe
has come to represent, an embodiment that Mr. McEnroe's fame
and public conduct have created.3 1' Similarly, the Guy Lombardo-
style arrangement of "Auld Lang Syne" standing alone is less evo-
cative of Lombardo's persona than it is of the idea of a New Year's
Eve celebration, a decidely public matter. At some point some as-
pect of the celebrity may transcend his own persona and become
evocative of some more general, if not generic concept.312 The issue
308. Because the relevant interest is that of the celebrity in the exclusive control of his
persona's associative value rather than the general public's interest in freedom from decep-
tion, the disclaimer or disclosure is not really relevant. See supra notes 266-68 and accom-
panying text.
309. Cf. Ausness, supra note 6, at 992. "The [impersonator] is not merely appropriat-
ing an idea, but he is also trying to evoke the plaintiff's identity. In effect, he attempts to
capitalize on the good-will and public interest in the plaintiff." Id.
310. Cf. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661
(2d Dep't 1977).
311. As Mr. McEnroe recently said in a different context, "[b]eing a celebrity like I am
is like being raped .... You can't do anything about it." New York Times, Nov. 27, 1985,
at 24, col. 1 (Nat'l. Ed.).
312. The world has long since forgotten the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling, but our lan-
guage has absorbed the word "quisling"; the individual came to embody the concept.
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thus may be not whether use of the identifier evokes the celebrity,
but whether the particular use of the persona evokes a broader
concept that is properly a part of the public domain and therefore
not within the right of publicity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity has grown out of the commercial reality
of celebrities' associative value. The interest that the right protects
is different from the interests embraced by concepts of privacy or
copyright or the various other legal categories to which the right of
publicity has been analogized. An interest analysis supports the in-
dependent right of publicity and subsumes the much litigated issue
of descendibility. That analysis comprehends the varied ways in
which a celebrity's persona may be evoked for commercial pur-
poses. With commercial personality interest as the focus, the right
of publicity may be bounded intelligently, and policy determina-
tions balancing that individual interest with public interests can be
made consistently and based soundly.
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